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533 
The Institutional Progress Clause 
 
Jake Linford* 
ABSTRACT 
There is a curious anomaly at the intersection of copyright and 
free speech.  In cases like Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, the United States Supreme Court has exhibited a profound 
distaste for tailoring free speech rights and restrictions based on the 
identity of the speaker.  The Copyright Act, however, is full of such 
tailoring, extending special rights to some copyright owners and special 
defenses to some users.  A Supreme Court serious about maintaining 
speaker neutrality would be appalled. 
A set of compromises at the heart of the Copyright Act reflects 
interest-group lobbying rather than a careful consideration of what 
kinds of institutions best realize the goal of the Progress Clause—the 
provision that expressly empowers Congress to provide copyright 
protection.  Assuming the democratic process is flawed for predictable 
public-choice reasons, how might the Court address these problems in 
the Copyright Act? 
The answer is institutional analysis.  First Amendment scholars 
have for some years used institutions as analytical and normative tools.  
This framework considers how different social institutions may serve 
First Amendment goals—like creating a robust marketplace of ideas—
through their structure and function.  This Article is the first to explore 
how the Progress Clause can serve a similar role and provides a 
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framework to consider whether certain institutions are particularly well-
suited to enable the creation, dissemination, or preservation of valuable 
expression.  Inasmuch as Congress has granted special privileges to 
institutions that serve Progress Clause values, the  
speaker-based tailoring is constitutionally acceptable—even if the 
process by which it occurs is suspect.  Applying this institutional 
framework can help clarify not only the extent to which the current 
Copyright Act achieves the constitutional goals it was crafted to reach, 
but also when Congress should adopt or reject amendments and 
extensions to the Copyright Act. 
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Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution—sometimes 
referred to as the “Progress Clause”—authorizes Congress to grant “to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries,”1 i.e., copyright and patent protection.  This power is 
internally limited by the Progress Clause, which authorizes the grant 
of an exclusive right only “for limited times” and for the stated purpose 
of “promot[ing] the progress of Science and useful Arts.”2  The First 
Amendment also limits the authority to grant copyright protection 
because, as the Court has recognized, “some restriction on expression is 
 
 1.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2.  Id.; see, e.g., Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion 
of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1810–16 
(2006). 
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the inherent and intended effect of every grant of copyright.”3  While 
commentators have argued that copyright laws should be subject to 
“procedural and substantive” First Amendment constraints,4 the 
Supreme Court has not applied searching First Amendment scrutiny to 
any provision of the Copyright Act to date.5 
There is something nevertheless puzzling about the relationship 
between copyright protection and free expression.  The Supreme Court 
has repeatedly invalidated statutes that discriminate among classes of 
speakers.6  For example, in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, the Court held unconstitutional a federal statute barring 
independent expenditures in elections based on the speaker’s corporate 
identity.7  But the Copyright Act is filled with provisions that run 
counter to this principle of speaker neutrality, instead providing a 
broader range of copyright protections to certain classes of speakers,8 
which this Article, following the relevant literature, refers to as 
“institutions.”9  Scholars and courts have acknowledged the speech-
 
 3.  Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889–90 (2012) (noting that Congressional activity will 
not trigger First Amendment scrutiny so long as Congress does not alter the traditional contours 
of copyright law that provide “built-in First Amendment accommodations” (citing Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003))). 
 4.  See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright within the First Amendment Skein, 
54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 47 (2001) [hereinafter Netanel, First Amendment Skein]; see also Jed 
Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 59 (2002) 
(“Copyright is today in the same position, vis-à-vis the First Amendment, as libel was before New 
York Times v. Sullivan. Just as the Court in Sullivan finally began issuing a set of special 
constitutional rules confining the reach of libel law, so the courts must eventually do for 
copyright.”). 
 5.  See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (2012) (rejecting a call to engage in  
“heightened [First Amendment] review” because the provision under review did not disturb 
traditional speech-protective contours built into the Copyright Act like the idea-expression 
distinction or the fair use defense); see also Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First 
Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1783 
[hereinafter Schauer, Boundaries] (2004) (“Copyright law, especially recently, has been the subject 
of some criticism, but its pervasive regime of content regulation and prior restraint remains largely 
unimpeded by the First Amendment.”). Indeed, until fairly recently, constitutional law scholars 
tended to overlook the Progress Clause. See Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson 
Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. 
REV. 953, 955 n.7 (2007). 
 6.  See infra Part I.A. 
 7.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010). 
 8.  For example, Congress recently restored copyright protection to the works of foreign 
nationals whose works fell into the public domain without restoring the copyright of works by US 
authors. 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2012); see also infra Part III.B. Other provisions grant unique defenses 
to certain institutions against the copyright owners’ exclusive right. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2012) 
(granting specific exceptions to copyright liability to libraries and other archives); see also infra 
Parts III.A, III.C. 
 9.  In the article that launched the field of new institutional economics, Douglass C. 
North defined institutions broadly, as “the humanly devised constraints that structure human 
interaction,” including formal and informal constraints. Douglass C. North, Economic Performance 
Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 359, 360 (1994). Some intellectual property scholars have taken 
536 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. [Vol. 16:3:533 
restrictive potential of copyright protection,10 which raises the 
possibility that much of the current Copyright Act may be 
unconstitutional because it favors groups in a way inconsistent with the 
Court’s commitment to speaker neutrality in the free speech arena.11 
Many scholars have pushed back on the Court’s resistance to 
institutional tailoring in interpreting the Speech Clause.12  As argued 
by scholars like Frederick Schauer, institutions like libraries, 
universities, and the professional press might deserve “special 
solicitude” under the Speech Clause because in their typical operation, 
they advance First Amendment goals.13  The Court has rejected 
institutional tailoring in the speech domain,14 but it has been more 
sympathetic to institutional tailoring when justified on other 
constitutional grounds.  For example, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the 
 
a similarly broad approach in defining First Amendment institutions—like best practices in 
content-creating and content-using industries—that might deserve deferential treatment from 
Congress and the courts. See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, Some Optimism About Fair Use and 
Copyright Law, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 351, 358 (2010). This Article instead follows Paul 
Horwitz and uses a narrower construction that defines institutions as organizations, focusing more 
on the entities that can embody “institutional norms,” rather than the norms themselves. See PAUL 
HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 11 (2013).  
 10.  See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text; see infra notes 101–114 and 
accompanying text. 
 11.  See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 392–93 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[The text of the 
First Amendment] offers no foothold for excluding any category of speaker, from single individuals 
to partnerships of individuals, to unincorporated associations of individuals, to incorporated 
associations of individuals . . . .”); Peter DiCola, Copyright Equality, Free Speech, Efficiency, and 
Regulatory Parity in Distribution, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1837, 1891–92 (2013) (arguing that courts should 
review copyright’s unequal regulatory provisions to the same First Amendment scrutiny that other 
media regulations receive). 
 12.  See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 471 (2005) 
[hereinafter Horwitz, Grutter’s] (suggesting that Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), can be 
read as the rare case in which the Supreme Court takes institutions seriously); Frederick Schauer, 
Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1747, 1765 (2007) 
[hereinafter Schauer, Categories] (“[M]ost of the arguments against using institution-specific 
categories in law in general and in constitutional law in particular do not carry the day.”); 
Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84, 97 
(1998) [hereinafter Schauer, Principles] (arguing that apparent departures from standard First 
Amendment analysis in the cases of Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 
U.S. 666 (1998), which held that a public broadcaster can reasonably exclude an independent 
candidate from a presidential debate, and National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 
(1998), which held that a regulation that required the NEA to take general standards of “decency 
and respect” for religious beliefs into account in denying grant applications was not facially invalid 
or unconstitutionally vague, can be explained and justified “in terms of institutionally specific 
rules and principles”).  
 13.  See infra Part II.A. 
 14.  See, e.g., Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) 
(manuscript at 6) (noting that “the Court has [ignored the textual directive of the Press Clause 
and] extended to the press no protection beyond the rights guaranteed to all by the Speech 
Clause”). 
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Court held that the Free Expression Clause of the First Amendment 
extends “special solicitude” to the rights of religious institutions.15 
This Article adds to that literature by arguing that institutions 
may also have the potential to inherently serve “Progress” values.  For 
example, some institutions, like universities, include among their 
traditional functions the progress value of increasing and cataloging the 
storehouse of human knowledge.  Others institutions may serve key 
roles in disseminating new works to the public and providing a reward 
for creators.  Some disparate treatment might thus be justified under 
the Progress Clause even if it is not justified under the First 
Amendment. 
Part I sets the stage by describing the limits that the Progress 
Clause and the First Amendment place on Congressional authority to 
enact copyright protection and discussing how the disparate treatment 
built into the Copyright Act may run afoul of the Court’s First 
Amendment bar against speaker-based regulation.  Part II builds on 
existing literature in the First Amendment sphere to argue that the 
Copyright Act may be partially redeemed by identifying institutions 
that externalize three key “Progress Clause values”: incentivizing 
creation and dissemination, expanding knowledge, and providing public 
access.  Part III applies the proposed institutional review framework to 
several provisions of the Copyright Act, highlighting examples of more- 
and less-appropriate tailoring.  Part IV identifies how the institutional 
review framework shows potential to improve judicial review, 
encourage public activism, and shape interest-group behavior and 
congressional activity. 
I. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND DISPARATE TREATMENT 
This Part discusses the Court’s recognition of the value of 
speaker neutrality in First Amendment law, particularly in the recent 
decisions in Citizens United v. FEC and Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.  It 
then sketches some of the problematic disparate treatment in the 
Copyright Act, and addresses some less-feasible solutions to the 
problem before introducing the potential of institutional tailoring 
driven by Progress Clause values. 
 
 15.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity 
Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012); Zoë Robinson, What is a “Religious Institution”?, 55 B.C. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
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A. The Trouble with Speaker-Based Distinctions 
The First Amendment proclaims that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”16  That 
pronouncement is not as absolute as a simple textual analysis would 
indicate.17  While restrictions on some “well-defined and narrowly 
limited classes of speech . . . have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem,”18 the Court applies some level of 
constitutional scrutiny to the regulation of protectable speech.19  In 
particular, the Court discourages inequitable, speaker-based 
abridgments of free speech.  It has repeatedly held that restrictions that 
discriminate against or favor certain groups of speakers and not others 
are unconstitutional.20  This is due in part to the potential of speaker-
 
 16.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 17.  See, e.g., Members of the City Council of City of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 
U.S. 789, 808 (1984) (“The incidental restriction on expression which results from the City’s 
attempt to [reduce visual clutter] is considered justified as a reasonable regulation of the time, 
place, or manner of expression if it is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” (citing Heffron v. 
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 61, 68–71 (1981); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 
455, 470–71 (1980); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115–17 (1972); Police Dep’t of Chi. 
V. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98 (1972))). Note that an absolutist view of the First Amendment is likely 
unworkable, and would render unconstitutional “all of contract law, most of antitrust law, and 
much of criminal law.” Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three 
Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 270 (1981). The same would likely be true if an absolutist view were 
applied to copyright law. But see, e.g., DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 2 (2009) (arguing that 
a correct interpretation of the First Amendment would make unconstitutional the grant of an 
exclusive right in the reproduction of expression). 
 18.  Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There are certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have 
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 
478 (2010) (“From 1791 to the present . . . the First Amendment has permitted restrictions upon 
the content of speech in a few limited areas, and has never included a freedom to disregard these 
traditional limitations.” (internal quotations and alterations omitted) (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 
505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992))); see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (incitement); 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (obscenity); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (fighting 
words). 
 19.  See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2737 (2011) (noting that a 
state law restricting the sale of violent video games to minors “is invalid unless [the state] can 
demonstrate that [the law] passes strict scrutiny” (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395)); Turner Broad. 
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661–62 (1994) (applying intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral 
regulation of cable providers). 
 20.  Often, when the Court addresses constitutionally problematic disparities in the law, 
it applies the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Police Dep’t of the City of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 
92, 96 (1972) (“[U]nder the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First Amendment itself, 
government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny 
use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.”). This Article instead 
considers the Court’s rationale for a speaker-neutral First Amendment. See also Jeffrey M. Blum, 
The Divisible First Amendment: A Critical Functionalist Approach to Freedom of Speech and 
Electoral Campaign Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1329 (1983) (“[C]ourts [are required] with 
certain subject matter exceptions, to be strictly neutral with regard to a speaker's identity and 
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based restrictions on speech to slide into content-based or viewpoint-
based discrimination,21 which are also disfavored forms of speech 
restrictions.22 
The Court first articulated a principle of speaker neutrality in 
Police Department v. Mosley.23  In Mosley, the Court held 
unconstitutional the city of Chicago’s regulation that banned picketing 
in front of schools during school hours, except for “peaceful picketing of 
any school involved in a labor dispute.”24  In finding the picketing ban 
unconstitutional, the Court closely connected the barred  
speaker-based distinction with invidious content-based distinctions 
designed to keep certain topics out of the public forum.25 
Mosley was a watershed case because it was the first time the 
Court had described First Amendment protections in terms of 
equality.26  Cases following Mosley clarified how discrimination against 
groups of speakers could be problematic, even without an invidious 
underlying content- or viewpoint-based goal.27  The Court invalidated 
 
message in determining whether behavior satisfies the disruptive potential test.”); Kenneth L. 
Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 26–29 (1975); 
Schauer, Principles, supra note 12, at 98–99 (noting that in the typical government enterprise 
cases, the concern is not access, but discriminatory treatment, and concluding that “content-based 
discriminatory treatment is appropriate in some [First Amendment] contexts but not in others”); 
Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with 
Anti-Pornography Law, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulations, 42 B.C. 
L. REV. 1, 63 (2000) (“Various aspects of First Amendment law are structured to minimize 
disparate effects on identifiable groups”). 
 21.  See Turner, 512 U.S. at 678 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 189, 249 (1987) [hereinafter Stone, Content Regulation]. 
 22.  See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396 (holding unconstitutional a prohibition on  
“bias-motivated” fighting words because it was viewpoint based, even though a viewpoint neutral 
prohibition on those words would be valid because the fighting words themselves are not protected 
speech). 
 23.  Mosley, 408 U.S. at 100; see also Karst, supra note 20, at 26–27, discussed in Geoffrey 
R. Stone, Kenneth Karst’s Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 37, 37–39 (2008) (noting that, after Mosley, if the government “allow[s] more speech than it 
is constitutionally required to allow, the government creates an inequality that cases like Schacht 
[v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970)] and Mosley hold must be independently justified”).  
 24.  Mosley, 408 U.S. at 92–93. 
 25.  See id. at 100. 
 26.  See Karst, supra note 20, at 28. In the words of Justice Marshall’s majority opinion, 
which blended equal protection and First Amendment analysis, “the crucial question is whether 
there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment.” 
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75–77 (1971); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972)). Justice Marshall 
went on to note that “the First Amendment means that the government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Id. (citations 
omitted). 
 27.  See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 194 (1999) 
(“[Government] decisions that select among speakers conveying virtually identical messages are 
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bans on political speech by banks and corporations,28 struck down 
regulations that distinguished among media companies,29 and rejected 
rules that prevent government employees from receiving an 
honorarium for speaking, teaching, or writing articles on topics not 
related to their employment.30 
While there were indications that the Court was backing away 
from a speaker-neutral First Amendment in cases like Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,31 the Court recently took a sharp 
turn back toward the principle of a speaker-neutral First Amendment.  
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Court 
invalidated a ban on election advertising by corporations.32  The Court 
concluded that Congress could not constitutionally treat corporations 
differently than other speakers.33  Doing so would “tak[e] the right to 
speak from some and giv[e] it to others . . . depriv[ing] the 
 
in serious tension with the principles undergirding the First Amendment.” (citing Carey v. Brown, 
447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777, 784–85 (1978))). 
 28.  First Nat’l Bank of Bos., 435 U.S. at 793; see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010); infra notes 71–75 and accompanying text. 
 29.  Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229 (1987) (noting that a tax 
could not constitutionally target “a small group within the press,” even though it did not target 
particular viewpoints); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 
575, 585, 592 (1983) (holding unconstitutional a tax that targeted the largest not only publishers 
for taxation). But see Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991). In Leathers, the Court held that a 
sales tax on cable television (and later) satellite services that exempted newspapers and magazines 
did not violate the First Amendment. In distinguishing Arkansas Writers’ and Minneapolis Star, 
the Court concluded the tax in Leathers was acceptable precisely because it targeted an entire 
media branch—cable operators (and later, satellite operators)—and not a smaller subset of a 
particular media branch. Id. at 447–48. The Court in Leathers tried unsuccessfully to recast both 
earlier cases as rejecting “a tax scheme that targets a small number of speakers” as dangerous 
because such a tax “runs the risk of affecting only a limited range of views,” id. at 448, 453, but 
there was, however, nothing content- or viewpoint-based about the taxes rejected in Minneapolis 
Star or Arkansas Writers’. 
 30.  United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 468–70 (1995) 
(concluding the regulation, while neither content- nor viewpoint-based, nevertheless “impose[d] a 
significant burden on expressive activity” by the employees, and “on the public’s right to read and 
hear what the employees would otherwise have written and said”). 
 31.  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622 (1994). Scholars initially hailed 
Turner as a vanguard of a new era, moving away from the principle of speaker neutrality. See, e.g., 
Erik Forde Ugland, Cable Television, New Technologies and the First Amendment After Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 60 MO. L. REV. 799, 831 (1995) (“After Turner, it is no longer 
certain that regulations targeting particular media or organizations will be found 
unconstitutional.”). 
 32.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 318 (2010) (overruling Austin 
v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1989)). 
 33.  Id. at 349 (“If the antidistortion rationale [propounded in an earlier case] were to be 
accepted, however, it would permit Government to ban political speech simply because the speaker 
is an association that has taken on the corporate form.”); see also James Ianelli, Noncitizens and 
Citizens United, 56 LOY. L. REV. 869, 885–86 (2010) (“[T]he Court [in Citizens United] showed that 
a principal concern with speaker-based restrictions is that they deprive citizens of their right to 
hear from certain subsets of speakers . . . .”). 
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disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to strive to 
establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker’s voice.”34  In his 
concurrence in Citizens United, Justice Scalia reiterated that the First 
Amendment “is written in terms of ‘speech,’ not speakers.  Its text offers 
no foothold for excluding any category of speaker . . . .”35 
Speaker-based preferences in the marketplace of ideas present 
a variety of problems.  They can distort public debate.36  They may be 
motivated by the impermissible but not readily apparent goal of 
enacting content- or viewpoint-based restrictions on speech.37  Speaker-
based preferences might also produce disparate effects whose 
restrictive impact can be difficult to measure in some cases.38  The 
imposition of speaker-based regulation might indicate either that a 
stated government interest motivating the speech restriction is 
somewhat exaggerated,39 or that Congress has failed to take into 
account the broader effects a certain benefit will have on nonbenefitted 
speakers.40  The state may even silence speakers when it denies benefits 
to those who speak out in certain ways but grants those same benefits 
to those who remain silent or advocate in a different way.41 
 
 34.  Citizens United, 558 U. S. at 341 (“The Government may not by these means deprive 
the public of the right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy 
of consideration.”); see also id. at 394 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The 
basic premise underlying the Court’s ruling is its iteration, and constant reiteration, of the 
proposition that the First Amendment bars regulatory distinctions based on a speaker’s identity, 
including its ‘identity’ as a corporation.”).  
 35.  Id. at 392–93 (Scalia, J., concurring); but see id. at 420–21 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“[I]n a variety of contexts, we have held that speech can be regulated 
differentially on account of the speaker’s identity, when identity is understood in categorical or 
institutional terms. The Government routinely places special restrictions on the speech rights of 
students, prisoners, members of the Armed Forces, foreigners, and its own employees. When such 
restrictions are justified by a legitimate governmental interest, they do not necessarily raise 
constitutional problems.” (citations omitted)).  
 36.  Turner, 512 U.S. at 676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Laws that treat all speakers 
equally are relatively poor tools for controlling public debate, and their very generality creates a 
substantial political check that prevents them from being unduly burdensome. Laws that single 
out particular speakers are substantially more dangerous, even when they do not draw explicit 
content distinctions.” (citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 
U.S. 575, 584, 591–92 (1983); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991)). 
 37.  See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive 
in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 454 (1996) (“So long as a content-neutral law 
has differential effects on particular ideas—even assuming those effects are widely dispersed—it 
may bear the taint of improper motive.”). 
 38.  See Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 21, at 218. 
 39.  See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending 
Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2423 (1996) (defining copyright law as a “content-based 
restriction[] on high-value speech imposed by the government acting as sovereign”).  
 40.  See Netanel, First Amendment Skein, supra note 4, at 59, 62. 
 41.  But see Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits 
of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 96 (1988) (refuting that argument as presented by striking union 
workers in Lyng v. Int’l Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 369 (1988)).  
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Speaker-based tailoring can easily slide into viewpoint-based 
tailoring, especially when the identified group benefitting from or 
restricted by the tailoring holds certain views in common. For example, 
if Congress passes a law that abridges the ability of identified members 
of the Tea Party to gather in public places, it might indicate that those 
in political opposition to the Tea Party, or those who disagree with ideas 
typically associated with the Tea Party, were attempting to silence 
dissenting views.  On the other hand, a law that provides extra 
privileges to members of the Tea Party might raise the specter of 
legislative capture that can also distort speech by granting disparate 
access.42 
While it might be tempting to limit strict scrutiny of  
speaker-based tailoring to political activity in light of the focus in 
Citizens United on election advertising, the Court also recently applied 
it to speaker-based restrictions on commercial speech.  In Sorrell v. IMS 
Health, the Court applied heightened scrutiny to strike down a 
regulation barring the sale of information about doctors’ habits in 
prescribing medicines to pharmaceutical detailers.43  Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the Court, noted that the law contained a content-based 
restriction that disfavored marketing.44  But Justice Kennedy also 
expressed concern about the law’s speaker-based effects, independent 
of content.45  For example, under one provision of the statute at issue in 
Sorrell, pharmacies could sell prescribing information to private or 
academic researchers, but not to pharmaceutical marketers.46 
The decisions in Citizens United and Sorrell signal a continuing 
commitment by the Court to a speaker-neutral First Amendment in 
 
 42.  But see Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87,  
101–02 (1982) (holding campaign disclosure requirements could not be applied to the Socialist 
Workers Party because such disclosure would expose Party members to harassment, threats and 
reprisals); Geoffrey R. Stone & William P. Marshall, Brown v. Socialist Workers: Inequality as a 
Command of the First Amendment, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 583, 583 (querying whether the “First 
Amendment compel[s] the government to exempt particular speakers from an otherwise 
constitutional law of general application”). 
 43.  See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011). 
 44.  Id. at 2663–64. 
 45.  See id. at 2667 (comparing Vermont’s bar on selling information to detailers to a 
hypothetical statute, based on Minneapolis Star, that would prohibit “trade magazines from 
purchasing or using ink”); see also Marcias M. Boumil, Pharmaceutical Gift Laws and Commercial 
Speech Under the First Amendment in the Wake of Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 8 J. HEALTH & 
BIOMEDICAL L. 133, 161 (2012) (“The regulation was . . . speaker-based because it allowed purchase 
and use by some recipients (such as researchers and public health professionals) but not others 
(specifically pharmaceutical companies and their marketing departments).”). 
 46.  See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2662–63 (noting that the regulation was content-based, and 
“[m]ore than that, the statute disfavors specific speakers, namely pharmaceutical 
manufacturers”). 
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both the political and commercial arenas.47  As identified in the next 
subpart, the Copyright Act as currently constituted manifests 
substantial institutional tailoring.48  Under the Court’s speaker-neutral 
interpretation of the Speech Clause, much of this tailoring appears 
unconstitutional. 
B. Constitutional Implications of Copyright Tailoring 
The Copyright Act boasts provisions that provide specific 
advantages—and disadvantages—to different institutions or interest 
groups.  For example, Congress restored copyright protection to works 
that had fallen out of protection in the United States because of a failure 
to observe certain formalities.49  This restoration is available for works 
created or initially owned by foreign residents or domiciliaries, but not 
residents of the United States.50  In addition, the owner of the copyright 
in a musical composition holds an exclusive right to publicly perform 
the work—and therefore license that right to others—while the owner 
of copyright in a sound recording has only the more limited right to 
perform publicly the work through digital audio transmission.51  Thus, 
terrestrial radio stations (i.e., over-the-air or broadcast stations) must 
pay for the right to broadcast musical compositions, but not the sound 
recordings embodying those compositions.52  Cable and satellite radio 
stations and Internet radio stations both must pay a compulsory license 
rate for the right to broadcast the sound recording as well.  While cable 
and satellite radio stations pay a relatively low license rate, Internet 
radio stations pay a much higher rate.53 
Defenses or exceptions to the reach of an author’s exclusive right 
are also often institution-specific.  Libraries and archives benefit from 
specific exceptions to the copyright owner’s exclusive right to reproduce 
the work.54  Likewise, veterans’ organizations and nonprofit fraternal 
 
 47.  The Court in Sorrell tried to cast its rejection of this regulation as consistent with 
what it continues to construe as a ban on laws that target a “narrow class” of speakers, like 
Arkansas Writers’ and Minneapolis Star. See id. at 2668 (noting that a ban on the speech of 
pharmaceutical companies throughout the state is more reminiscent of the tax held constitutional 
in Leathers that targets whole industries like cable operators without taxing other media 
industries, like newspaper and magazine publishers); see also supra note 29 (describing how the 
Court unsuccessfully attempted to distinguish Leathers from the earlier precedents); DiCola, supra 
note 11 at 1886. Thus, like Citizens United, Sorrell signals a strong shift away from the speaker-
based tailoring tolerated in Leathers. 
 48.  See infra Part I.B. 
 49.  See infra Part III.B. 
 50.  17 U.S.C. § 104(A)(g) (2012). 
 51.  Compare id. § 106(4), with id. § 106(6). 
 52.  See infra Part III.C. 
 53.  See infra Part III.C. 
 54.  17 U.S.C. § 108 (2012). 
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organizations can include performances of nondramatic literary or 
musical compositions in their social functions, so long as they donate 
any profits to charity.55 
Disparities like those mentioned above might give little cause 
for alarm, if not for the capacity of the copyright system to chill 
desirable expression.56  Copyright protection is economic regulation, a 
limited monopoly that gives authors and owners of copyrighted 
expression exclusive rights to make or authorize public performance or 
display of the expression,57 as well as exclusive rights to copy, 
distribute, or make new adaptations of copyrighted expression.58  
Exercising these rights without the permission of the copyright owner 
can trigger both criminal and civil liability,59 and statutory damages for 
civil infringement can reach $150,000 per work infringed.60  
Additionally, courts frequently grant preliminary and permanent 
injunctions against unauthorized users,61 even though the Court 
generally considers speech-restricting preliminary injunctions 
unconstitutional “prior restraints.”62 Thus, granting copyright 
 
 55.  Id. § 110(10) (specifically excluding college fraternities and sororities).  
 56.  See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression 
Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's ‘Total Concept and Feel’, 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 423–33 (1989). 
 57.  17 U.S.C. § 106(4)–(6) (2012). 
 58.  Id. § 106(1)–(3). 
 59.  Id. § 501 (violating the rights under § 106 infringes copyright protection, and subjects 
the violator to civil remedies under 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–505); id. § 506 (criminalizing willful copyright 
infringement). 
 60.  Id. § 504(c) (describing statutory damages as a remedy for copyright infringement). 
 61.  See id. § 502; see also Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and 
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 165 (1998); Volokh, supra note 39, at 
2459. 
 62.  The fact that private actors bring copyright complaints does not bar the application 
of First Amendment scrutiny on the ground that the First Amendment does not apply to private 
individuals. If the application of the remedies of copyright protection restricts First Amendment 
freedoms, the action of the courts is the action of the federal government. For example, the Court 
held, in Cohen v. Cowles Media, that the First Amendment would apply to a state court’s 
enforcement of a promissory estoppel claim, because promissory estoppel is a state-law doctrine 
creating legal obligations never explicitly assumed by the parties, but enforceable through the 
official power of the state’s courts. See Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991). Likewise, 
in New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court held that a civil lawsuit between private parties could 
impose invalid restrictions on the First Amendment freedoms of one of the parties. See New York 
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). While the Court has not explicitly addressed it, the 
exercise of federal power pursuant to the Copyright Act that allows a copyright owner to bring a 
private action in federal court and secure an injunction against otherwise protectable behavior 
would also amount to state action, and potentially trigger First Amendment protections. David 
McGowan argues that the First Amendment provides no justification for dealing with disputes 
between authors. David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 
U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 285 (2004). But when Congress sets baseline rules that preference one 
institutional group over another, it is troubling to conclude that the playing field has been leveled 
in a way that satisfies speaker-neutral First Amendment restrictions on government activity. 
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protection to the author of an expressive work allows the author to 
restrict subsequent uses of the work.63 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the speech-restrictive 
potential of copyright protection in articulating its rationale for not 
applying heightened First Amendment scrutiny in two recent cases that 
challenged amendments to the Copyright Act.64  In Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
the Court rebuffed a challenge to a twenty-year extension to the term 
of copyright protection, concluding it was unnecessary to apply 
searching First Amendment review.65  The Court supported its 
conclusion by focusing on the two “traditional contours” of copyright law 
encoded in the Copyright Act—the idea-expression dichotomy that 
prevents Congress from extending copyright protection to ideas,66 and 
the fair use defense, which allows some uses of protected works without 
securing the author’s permission or paying the author a royalty.67  The 
Court noted that Congressional action that altered those traditional 
contours would trigger First Amendment scrutiny.68  In Golan v. 
Holder, the Court rejected another First Amendment challenge to a 
statute that restored copyright protection to the works of foreign 
authors that had fallen into the public domain, on the ground that 
Congress left “undisturbed the ‘idea/expression’ distinction and the ‘fair 
use’ defense.”69 
Thus, the Court expressly recognized two elements of the 
Copyright Act that may not be altered without triggering First 
 
 63.  See L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 
n.12 (1987) (allowing the author “to control access to the copyrighted work” once it is published “is 
the essence of censorship”). 
 64.  See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Melville B. Nimmer Memorial Lecture, UCLA School of 
Law, First Amendment Constraints on Copyright After Golan v. Holder, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 
1086 (2013) [hereinafter Netanel, Constraints After Golan]. 
 65.  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003) (“[C]opyright law contains built-in 
First Amendment accommodations” allowing free use of ideas and providing a fair use defense, 
which “affords considerable ‘latitude for scholarship and comment’”) (citing and quoting Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)). Both the idea-expression 
dichotomy and the fair use provision are also described as implementations of Progress Clause 
values. See Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The 
Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1166 
(2000); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 305 (1988); 
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax 
Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1602 (1982). 
 66.  See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012); Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012); Feist 
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) (copyright assures authors 
the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and 
information conveyed by their work). 
 67.  The fair use defense is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). See also Golan, 132 S. Ct. 
at 890.  
 68.  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. See also Netanel, Constraints After Golan, supra note 64, at 
1086. 
 69.  Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890–91. 
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Amendment scrutiny.  Additionally, scholars and jurists argue that the 
Copyright Act is properly subject to more fulsome First Amendment 
constraints.70  In light of the potential chilling effects of copyright 
protection, it is puzzling that the Copyright Act—filled to the brim with 
rights that certain groups of copyright owners but not others can 
exercise, limitations on the rights of a subset of copyright owners that 
do not fall upon the majority, and defenses accessible only by certain 
institutional groups—is treated by the Court as consistent with First 
Amendment values as articulated in cases like Citizens United and 
Mosley. 
If the Copyright Act has speech-restricting effects,71 one might 
wonder how courts should apply First Amendment standards to 
evaluate this speaker-based institutional tailoring.  If the First 
Amendment provides any substantive limitations on the scope of 
granted copyright protection, can it tolerate the systematic disparity in 
speaker-based grants of both exclusive rights and defenses against 
those rights?  One potentially drastic response is “No.”  If the Court 
cannot permit Congress to restrict political advertising by corporations, 
may it allow Congress to restore copyright protection to the authors and 
owners of foreign works whose works fell out of protection because of a 
failure to observe now-invalid formalities, while denying that 
restoration to authors and owners of works created by American 
domiciliaries?72  If the Court applied strict scrutiny to every speaker-
 
 70.  See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 908 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that speech related harms 
caused by restoring copyright protection to works by foreign authors “show the presence of a First 
Amendment interest” sufficiently important “to require courts to scrutinize with some care the 
reasons claimed to justify the Act in order to determine whether they constitute reasonable 
copyright-related justifications for the serious harms, including speech-related harms, which the 
Act seems likely to impose.”); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 266 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
extension of copyright protection would cause “serious expression-related harm” without any 
“benefit [to] the public”); Lemley & Volokh, supra note 61, at 169 (citing Martin H. Redish, The 
Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53 (1984)). 
 71.  See Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 813 (2010); Sigmund 
Timberg, A Modernized Fair Use Code for the Electronic as Well as the Gutenberg Age, 75 NW. U. 
L. REV. 193, 229 (1980); see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 266 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that 
the scope of Congress’s legislative power must be discerned by reading the Copyright Clause “in 
light of the First Amendment”). 
 72.  This Article does not address the major differential treatment in the Copyright Act, 
which grants the author the exclusive right to copy, adapt, distribute, publicly perform, and 
publicly display the work, while the public may generally copy, adapt, distribute, publicly perform, 
or publicly display a copyrighted work only when the author grants permission. There is also a 
difference, here, between statutory grants and exceptions, which are the subject of this article, and 
fair use, which is not. Fair use is the backstop to every exclusive right granted by the Copyright 
Act, but when one starts from a position where one activity falls outside the copyright grant, and 
the other doesn’t unless a fair use defense applies, the first activity will occur more often, and be 
subject to less potential chilling than the latter. 
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based inequality in the Copyright Act, there would be little Copyright 
Act left. 
One might also argue that copyrighted expression and its 
alleged infringement are sufficiently distant from the core of First 
Amendment values that any potential slippage from speaker-based to 
content- or viewpoint-based effects is inconsequential.73  That argument 
is problematic for at least two reasons.  First, from 44 Liquormart, Inc. 
v. Rhode Island to Sorrell v. IMS, the Court has collapsed the 
boundaries between commercial and political speech.74 Second, 
sometimes the most effective political speech is grounded upon 
commercially valuable copyrighted expression.  For example, Alice 
Randall appropriated the characters of Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with 
the Wind in her novel The Wind Done Gone, which cast as heroes the 
slaves on Mitchell’s fictional plantations.75  By criticizing a book that 
romanticizes the antebellum South, Randall challenged America’s 
racist past.76  Her goal was simultaneously political and expressive.77  
Granting authors like Mitchell the ability to silence critiques like The 
Wind Done Gone would reduce access to viewpoints unpopular to 
copyright owners, some of which will be as close to the core of political 
speech as electioneering.78 
It might be sensible to try to avoid constitutional questions 
entirely, and some institutional tailoring is justified under traditional 
economic rationales.79  For instance, Joseph Liu notes that the 
 
 73.  See supra notes 35–42 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, 
Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 814–16 (1999) (arguing that an intratextual analysis of 
constitutional text would properly limit the First Amendment injunction that Congress shall make 
no laws abridging freedom of speech to Congressional action that restricts political discourse). 
 74.  See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 484 (1996); see, e.g., Fazal 
Khan & Justin Holloway, Verify, Then Trust: How to Legalize Off-Label Drug Marketing, 117 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 407, 439 (2012) (“[I]t appears [in light of Citizens United and Sorrell] that the Court is 
fundamentally rethinking the lower level of protection afforded to commercial speech under 
Central Hudson.”). 
 75.  See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 76.  See, e.g., David Roh, Two Copyright Case Studies from a Literary Perspective, 22 L. & 
LIT. 110 (2010). 
 77.  As Henry Louis Gates stated in support of Randall, The Wind Done Gone “constitutes 
both an original work of art and a moving act of political commentary, deconstructing as it does a 
text that many scholars believe to be racist.” Declaration of Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ¶ 7, Suntrust 
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (No. 1:01-CV-701-CAP), 
available at http://www.houghtonmifflinbooks.com/features/ 
randall_url/pdf/Declaration_Henry_Louis_Gates.pdf. 
 78.  Cf. Niels B. Schaumann, An Artist's Privilege, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 249, 253 
(1997) (“Tyrannical governments have long attempted either to suppress art or to channel it into 
politically correct themes and statements.”). 
 79.  Economic theory is frequently used to critique or justify the scope of copyright 
protection. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003).  
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increasingly complex institutional tailoring in the Copyright Act 
indicates that Congress is intervening “more substantially into the 
nature and structure of copyright markets, as opposed to leaving these 
details to the market.”80  Michael Carroll argues the economic case that 
uniform protection for copyrights is often inefficient, necessitating some 
type of differentiation among copyright owners to reduce uniformity 
costs.81 
While neither Liu nor Carroll tackle the First Amendment 
implications of industry-specific copyright law, they acknowledge that 
different institutional groups in the copyright can require different 
levels of protection.82  Such differential treatment may provide better 
clarity, at least for those regulated parties.83  It may also cure market 
failures and bring relative parties to the bargaining table with each 
other, or members of Congress.84 
Complexity presents downsides, however, including increased 
statutory complexity, decreased transparency, increased lobbying,85 
and perhaps too much deference to a Congress that is too busy  
fund-raising to take seriously its role as a constitutional gatekeeper.86  
As Neil Netanel and Jessica Litman have argued, certain interest 
groups can regularly and reliably turn to Congress for special benefits.87  
Congress’s expansion of protections under the Copyright Act has 
inspired criticism that industries that benefit from broad copyright 
protections have captured the legislative body.88  It may thus be 
reasonable, in light of that dynamic, to distrust any manifestation of 
disparate treatment in the language of the Copyright Act.89  While there 
 
 80.  Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 105 (2004).  
 81.  See Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring 
Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1389–94 (2009).  
 82.  See Liu, supra note 80, at 153; Carroll, supra note 81, at 1364. 
 83.  See Liu, supra note 80, at 134. 
 84.  See id. 
 85.  See id. 
 86.  See generally LARRY LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS – 
AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011); Oliar, supra note 2, at 1830 (noting the Court’s review in Eldred 
was “characterized by substantial deference to Congress’s subjective judgment”). 
 87.  See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL 
L. REV. 857, 869–79 (1987) [hereinafter Litman, Compromise]; Netanel, First Amendment Skein, 
supra note 4, at 67.  
 88.  See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 20, at 67 (arguing that in setting the threshold for 
Congressional activity that affects speech, “if the standard is too low, interest groups may capture 
the legislature and overprotect some speech at the expense of other speech,” which Tushnet argues 
happened during the recent extensions of copyright protection). 
 89.  See, e.g., CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT 
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 134–35 (2012) (“Even when 
legislators are dedicated to service the public interest, much of the information they receive comes 
from interest groups seeking to maximize their own welfare.”); Mark A. Lemley, The 
Constitutionalization of Technology Law, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 529, 532 (2000) (“Congress in 
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are reasonable arguments in favor of institutional tailoring on economic 
grounds,90 constitutional values are sufficiently important that 
economic rationales alone cannot justify the institutional tailoring in 
the Copyright Act.91 
While the Court has resisted speaker-based tailoring in its 
Speech Clause jurisprudence, there may be justifications for 
preferential treatment grounded in other constitutional provisions.  For 
example, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, the Court recently held that the 
Free Expression Clause of the First Amendment extends “special 
solicitude” to the rights of religious institutions.92  The Court’s holding 
in Hosanna-Tabor failed to define religious institutions, leaving 
scholars the challenge of creating a framework for determining which 
religious institutions qualify for that special solicitude.93  This Article 
undertakes a similar goal in the copyright context, identifying 
characteristics that institutions particularly deserving of solicitude 
under the Progress Clause may possess. 
II. PROGRESS CLAUSE VALUES 
As discussed above, speaker-based tailoring of speech 
protections has met with a chilly reception in the Supreme Court.94  
However, such disparate treatment may nevertheless be 
constitutionally permissible, so long as Congress picks the right 
institutions for favorable treatment.  Constitutional scholars have 
argued that courts should handle First Amendment inquiries along 
institutional lines by identifying institutions that promote speech 
values or externalize valuable speech in their typical operations and 
 
recent years seems to have abdicated its role in setting intellectual property policy to the private 
interests who appear before it.”). 
 90.  See, e.g., Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the 
Best Incentive System, 2 INNOVATION POL’Y & THE ECONOMY 51, 71 (2002). Scholars have also noted 
that the institutional tailoring in the Copyright Act may better assign rights ex ante to the parties 
best able to exploit them, see Carroll, supra note 81, at 1361, 1364, or increase clarity for regulated 
parties. See Liu, supra note 80, at 134. While economic analysis generally does not consider 
constitutional limits on institutional tailoring, it does suggest that not all instances of institutional 
tailoring lead to pernicious effects, or necessarily stem from misguided goals. 
 91.  Cf. Reece v. Gragg, 650 F. Supp. 1297, 1303 (D. Kan. 1986) (“[The] economic motive 
[of stretching inadequate prison resources] is an impermissible justification for the resulting 
constitutional violations.”). 
 92.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n 
132 S. Ct. 694, 704 (2012); see also generally Robinson, supra note 15. 
 93.  Id.; see also infra Part III.A. 
 94.  See supra Part I.A. 
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ensuring that Congress does not abridge the ability of those institutions 
to contribute to our general speech infrastructure.95 
Advocates for institutional tailoring of the First Amendment 
suggest that these lines should be drawn to favor “group[s] or 
organization[s] whose recognized function [is] to obtain information for 
the purpose of public dissemination.”96  Thus, an institutionally driven 
First Amendment regime would best promote speech values if courts 
could clearly identify institutions that serve as “repositor[ies] for 
certain constitutionally important values” and the extent to which 
“protecting those institutions would have the tendency to serve those 
values.”97  Well-drawn institutional lines could provide safe harbors 
against chilling valuable speech provided or intermediated by those 
institutional actors who can rely on their preferred First Amendment 
status.98  That in turn could allow courts to decide some cases earlier, 
potentially lowering litigation costs for First Amendment institutions.99  
It might also make courts more sensitive and responsive to the context 
in which public discourse occurs.100 
While the Court to date has not embraced special treatment of 
institutions under the Speech or Press Clauses, it has applied a 
ministerial exception, drawn from the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses of the First Amendment, to insulate the hiring decisions of 
religious institutions from governmental regulation.101 While extending 
these privileges to religious institutions can run counter to principles of 
speech neutrality,102 the decision to do so is grounded in other 
 
 95.  See generally HORWITZ, supra note 9; Schauer, Categories, supra note 12. Schauer 
suggests that these institutions will merit First Amendment solicitude because of characteristics 
that are “prelegal” or “extralegal,” existing regardless of legal rules. Id. at 1748–49. 
 96.  Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards 
a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 350–51 (2004) 
(suggesting that journalists, academic or scientific researchers employed by universities or the 
government, and researchers employed by public policy groups or think tanks would qualify). 
 97.  Schauer, Categories, supra note 12, at 1764. Paul Horwitz argues that First 
Amendment institutions are institutions which occupy a stable, central place in public discourse, 
and that engage in self-regulatory practices that arguably merit deference from courts. See 
HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 15; Horwitz, Grutter’s, supra note 12, at 589. 
 98.  See e.g., Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. 
REV. 1256, 1268 & n.63 (2005) [hereinafter Schaeur, Towards] (“[A]n institutional account of the 
First Amendment might yield more of a genuine privilege (that is, immunity from an otherwise 
applicable requirement, analogous to a reporter's privilege) of academic freedom than now exists 
in current doctrine.”). 
 99.  See id. 
 100.  See HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 92. 
 101.  See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity 
Comm’n 132 S. Ct. 694, 704 (2012). 
 102.  Cf. Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 
1353 (2012) (noting that the Government argued in Hosanna-Tabor “that religious groups are not 
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constitutional values co-equal with the  
speaker-neutrality principle drawn from the Speech Clause. 
Core principles can be similarly drawn from the text and history 
of the Progress Clause,103 which can aid in identifying institutions that 
might reasonably merit preferential treatment.  Indeed, the Progress 
Clause grants Congress specific authority subject to substantive limits, 
both in its requirement that exclusive rights last for limited times and 
its overarching purpose that exclusive rights are secured to “promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”104  The Progress Clause rests 
on three overlapping values—incentivizing creation and dissemination, 
expanding knowledge, and providing public access.  “Progress 
institutions” that externalize these values may merit particularly 
solicitous treatment under the Copyright Act.105 
A. The Progress Clause as a Substantive Limit on Congressional 
Authority 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution—which includes the 
Progress Clause—spells out the enumerated powers of Congress and 
provides it with the authority to enact laws “necessary and proper” to 
exercise those powers.106  Congress’s core regulatory power stems from 
the Commerce Clause.107  The Progress Clause provides Congress with 
a specific—but limited—power to craft protection for copyrighted 
expression and patented inventions. Specifically, it authorizes Congress 
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”108 
Some scholars, like Professor Nimmer, have argued that the 
“progress” phrase is merely a preamble that provides no substantive 
limit on congressional authority.109  Others, like Thomas Nachbar, have 
argued instead that the progress requirement is too ambiguous to 
 
entitled to protections beyond those available to nonreligious expressive associations under the 
Free Speech Clause”). 
 103.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 104.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see infra Part II.A. 
 105.  See infra Parts II.B.–II.D. 
 106.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 107.  Id. cl. 3. 
 108.  Id. cl. 8. 
 109.  See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] 
(Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.) (“[T]he phrase ‘To promote the progress of science and useful arts …’ 
must be read as largely in the nature of a preamble, indicating the purpose of the power but not 
in limitation of its exercise.’”). 
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justify judicial intervention,110 or that the concept of progress denies 
definition and thus provides courts with too little guidance to overturn 
congressional regulation in the intellectual property space.111 
It is, however, the work of courts to provide meaning for 
ambiguous or uncertain constitutional language.112  Arguing that the 
Progress Clause provides no substantive limit is problematic precisely 
because such an argument ignores the unique structure of the 
Intellectual Property Clause.  That structure makes the clause the sole 
Article I, Section 8 power that describes a particular means to 
accomplish its particular end: promoting progress through an exclusive 
grant to authors and inventors.113  Likewise, to construe the “progress” 
phrase as merely preambular makes a nullity of constitutional 
language.  Reading the progress requirement out of the Clause thus 
runs afoul of the principles of constitutional interpretation that the 
Court employs.114 
More critically, one must understand what the Intellectual 
Property Clause empowers Congress to do.  Compare the Intellectual 
Property Clause with the Commerce Clause.  The Commerce Clause of 
Section 8 grants Congress power “to regulate Commerce.”115  The power 
granted under the Intellectual Property Clause is not the power to 
secure an exclusive right to authors and inventors,116 but the power “[t]o 
 
 110.  See Thomas B. Nachbar, Judicial Review and the Quest to Keep Copyright Pure, 2 J. 
ON TELECOM & HIGH TECH L. 33, 55 (2003) (arguing that calls to treat the public choice problems 
in creating copyright law as unique are a misguided attempt to “respond to a problem with 
representative government by discarding it”). 
 111.  See id. at 67 (“Application of the Progress Phrase involves a nested imponderable: Not 
only is the net effect on progress of virtually any change in the copyright law imponderable, but 
the very nature of progress is itself imponderable.”). 
 112.  See e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522, 528 (1972) (noting the difficulty in 
defining or construing the boundaries of the right to a speedy trial, but nevertheless providing a 
test for assessing the point at which the right to a speedy trial must be asserted or waived).  
 113.  Compare Nachbar, supra note 110, at 55 (“Other than an awkwardly worded clause 
in the Constitution to provide a textual hook, what makes copyright so special?”), with Edward C. 
Walterscheid, The Preambular Argument: The Dubious Premise of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 44 IDEA 
331, 378 (2004) (“If the words of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison have any meaning, 
then the phrase ‘To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’ in the Science and Useful 
Arts Clause cannot be merely a meaningless preamble.” (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 
176 (1803) (“The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that these limits may not 
be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written.”))). 
 114.  See, e.g., Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 381 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) 
(“The clause is not an open grant of power to secure exclusive rights. It is a grant of a power to 
promote progress.”); see also Heald & Sherry, supra note 65, at 1160–66 (arguing that limitations 
on Congressional activities taken pursuant to its respective Section 8 enumerated powers must be 
grounded in the justification for that power). 
 115.  U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 116.  Id. cl. 8. 
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promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”117  And the power to 
promote the progress of science is by definition narrower than the power 
to regulate commerce.118 
One might accept the limiting function of the Progress Clause 
and still be concerned about the difficulties posed by institutional  
line-drawing regimes more generally.  Like other line-drawing or  
rule-creating regimes, an institutional framework could be both  
over- and underinclusive.  Some members of an institutional group 
might fall short in externalizing constitutional values.119  Likewise, 
some actors that externalize constitutional values might be left without 
certain privileges because they cannot be slotted into a particular 
institutional frame.120 
In addition, to the extent institutional line drawing requires 
identifying an “existing social institution” with “moderately 
identifiable” boundaries,121 it is important to recognize those 
identifiable boundaries may be due as much to legal structures as any 
prelegal reality.122  For example, Aereo offers subscribers access to a 
remote antenna that captures broadcast signals and reroutes them to 
the subscriber’s compatible device for viewing.123  The Supreme Court 
has granted certiorari and will soon determine whether Aereo’s services 
 
 117.  Id. But see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST 
PERIOD, 1789–1801, at 93 (1997) (arguing that the Intellectual Property Clause does not confer “a 
general power to ‘promote the progress of science and the useful arts,’ but only the power to grant 
limited exclusive rights in order to accomplish that goal”). 
 118.  See e.g., Oliar, supra note 2, at 1844 (“[T]he ‘progress’ language in the Clause provides 
a textual basis for the negation of the implication that the power to ‘promote’ progress implies the 
grant of power to ‘retard’ progress of arts and sciences.”); see also Jake Linford, A Second Look at 
the Right of First Publication, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 585, 595–604 (2011) [hereinafter 
Linford, First Publication] (critiquing the Court’s limited view of the Progress Clause 
requirement). 
 119.  Cf. Joshua G. Hazan, Note, Stop Being Evil: A Proposal for Unbiased Google Search, 
111 MICH. L. REV. 789, 792, 819 (arguing that while Google “spearheaded the net neutrality 
movement,” its own behavior “has begun to threaten the very openness and diversity it once 
championed”). 
 120.  See, e.g., Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1058–
60 (2011) (noting that accepting special protection for an institutional press might leave some 
actors without Press Clause protections, but arguing the Speech Clause provides a sufficient 
backstop to minimize the concern); see also HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 168–69 (arguing that instead 
of expanding the definition of institutional press to include bloggers, we “should define blogs’ 
institutional autonomy in a way that is appropriate to [their] unique institutional features and 
practices”); RonNell Andersen Jones, Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy in a  
Post-Newspaper America, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557, 612 (2011) (arguing that even if 
disaggregated media entities can provide the public with news, those entities “are unlikely to take 
on all of the roles [like litigating to shape and enforce free speech law] that newspapers once 
unitarily played in American society.”). 
 121.  Schauer, Towards, supra note 98, at 1275. 
 122.  See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 123.  About Aereo, AEREO, https://aereo.com/about (last visited Feb. 27, 2014). 
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violate a provision of the Copyright Act.124 The particular structure of 
Aereo’s features, however, appear to have been made to qualify for a 
safe harbor from copyright liability carved out for a similar service by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Cartoon 
Network v. CSC Holdings, Inc.125  The development of Aereo’s business 
mode seems to be driven as much by legal constraints as by 
technological capacity or consumer need.126 
It is true that an institutional review framework cannot catch 
every problematic change in the Copyright Act.127  In some cases, 
institutional or speaker-based tailoring might be preferable than some 
speaker-neutral provisions of the Copyright Act.128  Finally, there is at 
least some danger that a line-drawing regime based on institutions 
could make the wrong determination and create bright lines within 
which “courts allow heavy speech restrictions and defer to government 
officials.”129 
But while the institutional framework is no panacea for all that 
ails copyright law, it is nevertheless a clear step in the right direction.  
As this Article details more fully in Part IV, the application of some 
level of searching review would kick-start a more productive 
conversation about the values our copyright policy should embody.130  In 
 
 124.  WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom. 
Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014) (No. 13-461) (mem.). 
 125.  See The Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139–40 (2d 
Cir. 2008). 
 126.  James Grimmelmann, Copyright Arbitrage in Action, THE LABORATORIUM (Mar. 4, 
2012, 1:00 PM), http://laboratorium.net/archive/2012/03/04/copyright_arbitrage_in_action. 
 127.  The Work Made For Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000 included a 
“housekeeping” amendment that added sound recordings to the list of works that could be works 
made for hire, even though the author was not an employee. This change would have hamstrung 
efforts by recording artists to terminate transfers of copyrighted works to record labels. Mary 
LaFrance, Authorship and Termination Rights in Sound Recordings, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 375, 410 
(2002). The amendment was considered problematic at the time, and almost immediately repealed, 
but it would not have triggered heightened constitutional scrutiny under the institutional review 
framework proposed by this Article. 
 128.  For example, the Copyright Term Extension Act, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)–(c) 
[hereinafter CTEA], added twenty years to the term of both existing works and works not yet 
created. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). Some critics argued that disparate 
treatment was more consistent with progress or speech values than uniformity, and uniform 
extension of the copyright term was the signal that something was rotten in the CTEA. See, e.g., 
Brief of Amici Curiae George A. Akerlof et al. at 15, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 
01-618) (“Comparing the main economic benefits and costs of the CTEA, it is difficult to understand 
[copyright] term extension for both existing and new works as an  
efficiency-enhancing measure.”). 
 129.  Scott Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners—Oh, My! A Cautionary Note About 
Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1635 1658–59 
(2007) (finding that relative to three institutions—public schools, workplaces, and prisons—
institutional line drawing has led to problematic heightened deference). 
 130.  See infra Part IV. 
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addition, evaluating the preferential treatment in the Copyright Act 
with an eye to locating progress institutions will lead to copyright laws 
more in harmony with their constitutional justification. 
The remainder of this Part discusses three overlapping  
goals—incentivizing creation and dissemination, expanding knowledge, 
and providing public access—that copyright protection must serve if it 
is to meet the agenda set by the Framers in the Progress Clause.131  And 
just as certain institutions may be particularly well-suited to promote 
the values underlying the Speech Clauses, some institutions, in their 
typical operation, are well-placed to promote the fundamental purposes 
of the Progress Clause.132  Those three core values drawn from the text 
and the historical context of the Progress Clause provide some 
indication of institutions that might merit special solicitude because, in 
their typical operation, they provide public benefits commensurate with 
one or more of these values.133 
B. Promoting Progress by Incentivizing Creation and Dissemination 
The exclusive right Congress grants to authors is often described 
as public facing, i.e., “the ultimate aim” of allowing an author to “secure 
a fair return” on her “creative labor” is “to stimulate artistic creativity 
for the general public good.”134  As reported by Edward Walterscheid, 
the Framers saw Congress’s authority to promote progress as a narrow 
power, limited to securing an exclusive right to authors and inventors 
in their writings and discoveries.135  For example, James Madison was 
 
 131.  See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use Markets: On Weighing Potential License Fees, 79 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1814, 1856, n.118 (2011) [hereinafter Gordon, License Fees] (noting that even 
if “Progress” is left undefined, one can make “preliminary assessments” about whether potential 
changes to the Act are consistent with the Progress clause); see also Oliar, supra note 2, at 1836 
(“‘Progress,’ of course, is not a clearly defined concept. It would not be straightforward, and it would 
perhaps even be difficult, for courts to determine which grants of intellectual property rights 
‘promote[] progress.’”). 
 132.  See infra Part II.E. 
 133.  See infra Part II.E. 
 134.  Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
 135.  See, e.g., Edward C. Walterscheid, Conforming the General Welfare Clause and the 
Intellectual Property Clause, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 87, 104–05 (1999)  [hereinafter Walterscheid, 
General Welfare]; see also Jeanne C. Fromer The Intellectual Property Clause’s External 
Limitations, 61 DUKE L.J. 1329, 1332 (2012) (arguing that both the textual structure and historical 
application of the Intellectual Property Clause bars Congress from using means other than 
securing an exclusive right to others and inventors to promote the specified end of promoting the 
progress of science and useful arts). But see Walterscheid, General Welfare, supra, at 102–03 
(arguing that Alexander Hamilton may have had the better of the argument that Congress had 
the power, pursuant to the General Welfare Clause, to pay directly for research and development); 
Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and 
Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL PROP. L. 1, 
32–33 (1994) (“The Clause was intended not so much as an express authority to promote the 
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convinced that Congress perceived itself as tied down: “to the single 
mode of encouraging inventions by granting the exclusive benefit of 
them for a limited time.”136  This relatively narrow reading suggests 
that Congress was empowered to provide for the public good in the 
copyright context by providing a means to incentivize creative labor 
through profitable dissemination.  Seeking “the promotion of progress” 
through a grant of exclusive rights to authors is consistent both with 
the prehistory of the Progress Clause and what little we can glean from 
the Constitutional Convention and contemporary sources about its 
adoption. 
The historical antecedents of the Constitution and the first 
federal copyright act in the United States illustrate the Framer’s view 
that an exclusive right—and the profit it secures—was designed to 
motivate creative expression.137  The Statute of Anne, England’s first 
copyright act, was ostensibly crafted “for the encouragement of 
learning” by preventing the printing of books “without the consent of 
the authors or proprietors.”138  In other words, Britain would promote 
knowledge by using exclusive rights to “encourage . . . learned men to 
compose and write useful books.”139 
The committee of the Continental Congress in charge of 
suggesting what type of copyright protection states might reasonably 
grant instead embraced a natural rights rationale.140  The committee 
 
progress of science and the useful arts, but rather as a means of ensuring authority to do so in a 
particular way . . . .”). 
 136.  See Letter from Tench Coxe to James Madison (Mar. 21, 1790), in 13 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON, 128 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1981). 
 137.  See e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (“The 
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an author’s creative labor. But 
the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156)); 
Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) “[C]opyright law 
celebrates the profit motive, recognizing that the incentive to profit from the exploitation of 
copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge. . . . The 
profit motive is the engine that ensures the progress of science.”); Bruce Abramson, Promoting 
Innovation in the Software Industry: A First Principles Approach to Intellectual Property Reform, 
8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 75, 93–94 (2002) (“Most people looking for an investment venue will choose 
to put their time, effort, and/or capital into tangible property that can be resold at a 
personal profit rather than into ideas that will benefit society at large but whose promised personal 
returns are limited. . . . IP rights thus represent a societal attempt to harness the profit motive in 
order to motivate innovation.”); Zi Wong, The Experimental Stage Doctrine: The Quiet Death of an 
Experimental Use Heresy, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 691, 692 (2000). 
 138.  The Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). For a more detailed discussion of the 
relationship between authors and stationers in the period leading up to the passage of the Statute 
of Anne and its subsequent enforcement, see Linford, First Publication, supra note 118, at 635. 
 139.  The Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
 140.  The historical record suggests that the Committee took testimony only from authors, 
which may make this an early example of successful interest group lobbying to secure copyright 
protection. But see Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection 
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concluded that “nothing is more properly a man’s own than the fruit of 
his study.”  But as often occurs, the natural rights rationale bled into 
utilitarian goals.141  The committee noted that “the protection and 
security of literary property would greatly tend to encourage genius 
[and] to promote useful discoveries.”142  And those states that extended 
copyright protection to their citizens primarily modeled their statutes 
on the Statute of Anne, which ostensibly protected the author’s profit 
incentive rather than an identity-based moral right.143 Some of the 
proffered language, however, reflected a Lockean concept of natural 
rights.144 
The limited historical record from the Constitutional Convention 
suggests that the Framers were convinced that there was a relationship 
between the grant of an exclusive right and the stimulation of desired 
output.  In addition to the language of the Progress Clause, the 
Constitutional Convention contemplated direct subsidies to 
universities or artists.145  For example, the Convention considered 
empowering Congress to “establish a University,” or “establish 
seminaries for the promotion of literature and the arts and sciences.”146  
Those direct subsidies were ultimately not included in the Progress 
Clause,147 an omission that was likely intentional.148 
 
of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 519–20 (1981) (“Notions of a natural right to 
the fruit of one’s labor, and of the injustice of the enrichment that falls to the taker are as much a 
part of copyright as the careful balancing of incentive and dissemination.”). 
 141.  See 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 211 (entry for May 2, 1783). 
 142.  See id. at 326–27, cited by Malla Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?: 
Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing 
the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 783–84, n.147 (2001). 
 143.  See, e.g., L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning 
the Founders’ View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of 
the U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 933 n.61 (2003) (“The state statutes were directed at the 
protection of authors' profits, rather than any moral rights she or he might have. The author, while 
the focus of the statutes, could pass the right to profit by publishing and vending to heirs or 
assigns.”). 
 144.  See, e.g., ACTS AND LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 236 (Boston 
1781–1783):  
Whereas the Improvement of Knowledge, the Progress of Civilization, the public Weal 
of the Community, and the Advancement of Human Happiness, greatly depend of the 
Efforts of learned and ingenious Persons in the various Arts and Sciences: As the 
principal Encouragement such Persons can have to make great and beneficial Exertions 
of this Nature must exist in the legal Security of the Fruits of their Study and Industry 
to themselves; and as such Security is one of the natural Rights of all Men, there being 
no Property more peculiarly a Man's own than that which is produced by the Labour of 
his Mind. 
 145.  See Oliar, supra note 2, at 1777. 
 146.  See e.g., id. at 1789. 
 147.  Id. at 1792–93 (noting that Congress rejected President Washington’s call to establish 
a university, and proposing that the decision not to include the power to establish a university 
meant the Framers intended not to provide that power). 
 148.  Id. at 1792. 
558 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. [Vol. 16:3:533 
There are no records about why the Constitutional Convention 
selected the language chosen, but James Madison embraced individual 
protection of copyrighted expression as necessary for the public good.149  
Madison asserted, “the public good fully coincides . . . with the claims of 
individuals.”150  And in one public essay, Madison equated control over 
one’s thoughts as a property right in the same way that control over 
one’s real estate was a property right—both necessary for a properly 
functioning government.151  Finally, when the first Congress passed the 
Copyright Act of 1790, the Act looked much like the aforementioned 
Statute of Anne—“[a]n Act for the encouragement of learning,” 
accomplished “by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the 
authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein 
mentioned.”152 
This rough glimpse of the historical background of the Framers’ 
views gives some general guidance regarding the “progress of science 
and useful arts” that copyright protection must promote.  As Dotan 
Oliar has noted, the decision to limit Congressional scope to securing 
exclusive rights to authors and inventors was most likely intentional.153  
Jeanne Fromer has concluded that Congress may not promote progress 
in any way other than securing exclusive rights to authors.154  Given 
the centrality of the exclusive right to the constitutional text, for 
progress to have meaning in light of that text, it must be progress that 
can be promoted by securing exclusive rights for authors to their 
writings.  The Progress Clause, and the Copyright Act enacted to 
accomplish its goals, envisioned an exclusive right to incentivize the 
creation and distribution of new expression.155  The author is not 
rewarded in the abstract for her efforts but for her creative output—
and even then only to the extent she can find a (paying) audience 
 
 149.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 150.  Id. at 272. But see Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory 
Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 771 (2001) (arguing that 
Madison misunderstood or misrepresented English precedent of the day, and that Madison did not 
embrace a natural rights justification for copyright protection). 
 151.  James Madison, Property, in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION Ch. 16, Doc. 23 (2000) 
(originally dated Mar. 29, 1792) (“[A] man has a property in his opinions and the free 
communication of them.”), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/ 
v1ch16s23.html. 
 152.  Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124. 
 153.  See supra notes 146–148 and accompanying text. 
 154.  See Fromer, supra note 135 at 1332 (arguing that “[t]he IP Clause’s text and 
placement within the constitutional structure suggest that Congress” may only promote progress 
by “securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries” and may promote progress by no other means). 
 155.  See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“By 
establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic 
incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”). 
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receptive to it.156  Exclusive rights of some sort must therefore be a part 
of the US copyright system.  To conclude otherwise would do 
considerable harm to the constitutional language. 
C. Promoting Progress by Expanding Knowledge 
The Progress Clause is also boundary defining.  The accepted 
wisdom is that it protects only two distinct types of addition to human 
knowledge: inventions, which receive patent protection, and writings, 
which receive copyright protection.157  The category of writings that 
qualify for protection today is much broader than those protected by the 
Copyright Act of 1790.158  Nevertheless, the Progress Clause builds in a 
natural limit recognized by the courts, as articulated in the  
idea-expression dichotomy.159  Some things fall outside of both copyright 
and patent protection, and are free for all to use.160  Congress may not 
grant perpetual protection, so that the authors’ writings are eventually 
released to the public.161  The public can freely exploit, reproduce, and 
resell works for which protection has expired at their marginal cost of 
reproduction.162 
Through both its subject matter limitations and the grant of an 
exclusive right only for limited times, the Progress Clause provides a 
substrate of freely accessible material on which any person can build 
his or her own creative expression or novel invention.163  This substrate, 
often called “the public domain,” is comprised of information that once 
was protected as intellectual property and information that may never 
 
 156.  See id. 
 157.  See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 887–88 (2012) (“Perhaps counterintuitively 
for the contemporary reader, Congress’ copyright authority is tied to the progress of science; its 
patent authority, to the progress of the useful arts.”); In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 
(1879) (holding that federal trademark protection cannot be justified under the Progress Clause 
because unlike copyright or patent protection, securing trademark rights does not “depend upon 
novelty, invention, discovery,” but only upon “priority of appropriation”). 
 158.  Compare, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012), with Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124. 
 159.  See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105–06 (1879); see also supra note 41 and 
accompanying text. 
 160.  See Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to 
Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 294 (1996) (defining the public 
domain as “the works and uses that are free for all to use”). 
 161.  See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003) (noting 
that Congress may not “create[] a species of perpetual patent [or] copyright”). 
 162.  This marginal cost nears zero in the Internet age. 
 163.  See Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 
368 (2005); Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright and Misappropriation, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 885, 887 
(1992) (“Because knowledge, technology, and culture advance by building on an existing base, too 
much protection for particular works can inhibit social progress rather than enhance it. One object 
of the game, at least insofar as it is based on incentive theories, is to determine where the 
protective lines are optimally drawn.”). 
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be protected as intellectual property.164  While this description might 
suggest that the public domain is an essential part of the constitutional 
scheme outlined in the Progress Clause, the Supreme Court in Golan v. 
Holder indicated that the concept of a public domain held little 
constitutional significance.165 
As discussed above, the Progress Clause’s statutory 
predecessors provided an exclusive right to authors and inventors, in 
part to increase the available store of knowledge.166  Founding-era state 
copyright statutes expressed goals like “the improvement of knowledge, 
the progress of civilization, and the advancement of human 
happiness.”167  Promoting the progress of science and useful arts might 
thus be effectively reducible to “encouragement of learning.”168 
The Supreme Court has articulated a fairly low Constitutional 
threshold for “creative” or “original” expression,169 and thus, increasing 
creative expression is not necessarily the same thing as increasing 
knowledge.170  Scholars disagree whether the Progress Clause requires 
an increase in quality of the knowledge base,171 a numerical increase in 
new inputs into the knowledge base,172 or the value of the knowledge 
base judged economically,173 but many argue that copyright protection 
 
 164.  See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991) 
(“Facts, whether alone or as part of a compilation, are not original and therefore may not be 
copyrighted.”). 
 165.  Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 n.26 (2012) (dismissing the argument that 
copyright legislation that restores protection to works in the public domain must also provide new 
incentives to create, “[e]ven assuming the public domain were a category of constitutional 
significance”); see also Lyle Denniston, From Plyler v. Doe to Trayvon Martin: Toward Closing the 
Open Society, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1799, 1815 (2012) (“[T]he Supreme Court essentially 
destroyed–at least in constitutional terms–the concept of a ‘public domain.’”). 
 166.  See supra notes 137–142 and accompanying text; see also BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 89, at ix (defining “innovation” as “any human idea that adds something important to 
what we already have”). 
 167.  See Oliar, supra note 2, at 1807. 
 168.  See Lawrence Solum, Congress’s Power to Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 45 (2002). 
 169.  See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 362 (“The standard of originality is low, but it does exist.”). 
 170.  Cf. Ned Snow, The Meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause, 2013 BYU L. REV. 259 
(arguing that “Science,” as used in the Progress Clause, means a system of knowledge comprising 
distinct branches of study, and in light of that meaning, Congress may not be empowered to extend 
copyright protection to expression that the First Amendment does not protect). 
 171.  See Fromer, supra note 135, at 1374 (stating that a law promotes progress “if it seeks 
to encourage advancement in areas of systematic knowledge, including cultural knowledge or 
technology.”); Solum, supra note 168, at 57 (proposing that the question to ask, before any statute 
is enacted is whether it will “encourage systematic knowledge and learning of enduring value?”). 
 172.  See Heald & Sherry, supra note 65, at 1163. 
 173.  Compare Fromer, supra note 135, at 1373, with Pollack, supra note 143, at 756. But 
see Heald & Sherry, supra note 65, at 1163 (noting that the “quid pro quo” principle they locate in 
the constitutional text “does not authorize a court to invalidate legislation simply because it does 
not increase wealth”). 
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is justified only when the protection results in an advance in knowledge, 
however defined.174 
In fact, the Progress Clause’s discernable focus on increasing 
knowledge has led some scholars to question whether the Framers 
would have been interested in the creation of the entertainment tent 
poles that currently drive much of Congress’s legislative agenda with 
regard to copyright protection.175  An increase in knowledge, properly 
defined, may be limited to an increase in things that are inherently 
valuable.176  Under this view, copyright protection for books as artifacts 
that promote the progress of science might be overinclusive if it protects 
copyrights in trashy literature, but would nevertheless be justifiable so 
long as an increase of knowledge was the end goal, not just a side 
benefit.177  There is danger, however, in trying to protect only works of 
a certain artistic or cultural value.178  While many scholars recognize 
the importance of the collective increase in knowledge, some suggest 
that intellectual property protection was always too blunt a policy 
instrument to promote “innovation and cultural progress.”179 
Despite the challenge of such line drawing, as Justin Hughes has 
identified, it is not far a stretch to conclude the “primary objective of 
intellectual property” is “to ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts’ by increasing society’s stock of knowledge.”180 Institutions that 
play a central role in cataloging and categorizing that stock of 
knowledge, broadly defined, might therefore merit special solicitude. 
D. Promoting Progress by Providing Access 
The Supreme Court has stated that ensuring access to 
copyrighted expression is the primary goal of copyright protection.181  
Some scholars suggest that the access aspect of the Progress Clause 
requires maximizing the broadest possible dissemination of 
copyrightable expression.182  Under that definition, any change in 
copyright protection would be merited only to the extent that it 
“increase[s] public access to writings.”183  But a commitment to 
 
 174.  See e.g., Oliar, supra note 2, at 1801 n.191. 
 175.  See Solum, Power, supra note 168, at 54. 
 176.  See Snow, supra note 170, at 264. 
 177.  See, e.g., Solum, Power, supra note 168, at 57–59. 
 178.  See Bleistein v.  Donaldson Lithographic Corp., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
 179.  See Carroll, supra note 81, at 1361. 
 180.  Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 295 (1988). 
 181.  See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); see also supra 
note 134 and accompanying text. 
 182.  See Pollack, supra note 142, at 760. 
 183.  Id. at 766. 
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dissemination does not necessarily require early or permanent 
absorption of a work into the public domain, so long as there is 
relatively affordable access for the public during the term of copyright 
protection.  Often, the owner of the work will offer different versions of 
a work, or in different formats, at different price points over time.184  
For example, publishers sell both hardback and paperback versions of 
the same book at different times,185 catching more price-sensitive 
purchasers with the more affordable paperback copy, which is released 
later than the hardback version.186  Libraries purchase copies that are 
lent to patrons at no cost, and publishers take the phenomenon into 
account when pricing volumes.187  Note that this price discrimination 
across versions can facilitate the production of public goods.188  Indeed, 
if the commitment to free access trumps the ability of copyright owners 
to charge a desired price for their expression, some potential authors 
will be dissuaded from spending the time to create new expression.189 
Accessibility does not require a copyrighted work to be free.190  
The Progress Clause provides for two types of public access: paid 
access—guaranteed by the exclusive right secured to the author—and 
access through the public domain once a work crosses the threshold of 
limited times.191  While copyright protection subsists, the copyright 
owner can withhold access to the work unless the public pays for it.192  
 
 184.  See Linford, First Publication, supra note 118, at 635. 
 185.  See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 288 F.3d 1028, 1031 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (Posner, J). 
 186.  See Julie Bosman, Paperback Publishers Quicken Their Pace, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 
2011 (reporting that publishers had shortened the delay in releasing paperback editions from one 
year to six months in response to pressure created by the availability of e-book editions). 
 187.  See Linford, First Publication, supra note 118, at 639. 
 188.  See, e.g., John P. Conley & Christopher S. Yoo, Nonrivalry and Price Discrimination 
in Copyright Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1801, 1810–11 (2009) (describing how public goods 
tend to be underprovided in the absence of price discrimination because the rational user will 
underreport the utility she derives from a public good, and thus the provider of a public good may 
underestimate its value (citing Paul A. Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories, 40 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 332, 334–36 (1958))); see also In re Brand Name, 288 F.3d at 1031 (“The publishing 
industry is extremely competitive but, as just noted, price discrimination is the norm in it.”). 
 189.  See, e.g., Cake: Flying High After a Record Low, NPR MUSIC (Mar. 3, 2011, 4:59 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/03/03/134233768/cake-tk (quoting John McCrea, lead singer and 
songwriter for Cake, who stated “I see music as a really great hobby for most people in five or [ten] 
years,” with “everybody I know, some of them really important artists, studying how to do other 
jobs”). 
 190.  See e.g., Conley & Yoo, supra note 188, at 1805 (arguing that the standard economic 
analysis that pits incentives for efficient creation against efficient access might be misguided); 
Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 ORE. L. REV. 19, 32–33 (1996) 
(“Public access is surely not necessary to the progress of science. . . . If we measure the progress of 
science by the profits of scientists, secrecy may greatly enhance the achievements we find.”). 
 191.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 192.  See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 893 (2012) (requiring would-be users to pay for 
access to a work did not deprive them of access to that work). 
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Engaging in certain uses of the work without the copyright owner’s 
authorization will infringe the owner’s exclusive right.193  In that case, 
the owner can seek monetary and injunctive relief,194 while the state 
may bring criminal charges.195  It is the author’s ability to determine 
the price of the work that provides the reward.  The more a given 
member of the public values a given work, the higher the price she will 
be willing to pay to consume it.196  Once the work falls out of copyright 
protection (or if some information never qualifies for protection in the 
first instance), anyone can utilize the work in any way, free of cost.197 
The limited term of protection provides for a second type of 
public access.  Once the work is in the public domain, the public can use 
the work for free.  Distributors, no longer required to meet the copyright 
owner’s price, can reproduce and distribute the work for the marginal 
cost of production.198 
We can interlace the three progress values identified above to 
suggest two types of institutional actors that might merit Progress 
Clause solicitude.  Because promoting progress means providing access 
to copyrighted expression, there exist two broad categories of access 
intermediaries, and it may be justifiable for Congress to treat 
institutions with those characteristics favorably. 
The first type of institutional actor is a collection intermediary, 
like a library or a university that serves as a repository for expression.  
These institutions can fulfill the access-promoting function in different 
ways.  Some, like public libraries, might use funds from the state to 
acquire a cache of materials that the public can used at little or no 
cost.199  Others, like private universities, might also cache materials, 
with access reserved for tuition paying students or fee-paying 
 
 193.  17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
 194.  Id. §§ 501–505. 
 195.  Id. § 506. 
 196.  See, e.g., Conley & Yoo, supra note 188, at 1809–10 (“Although every consumer 
necessarily consumes [the same quantity of a copyrighted work], different consumers may derive 
different levels of utility from doing so . . . and can only signal the intensity of their preferences by 
paying different prices.”). 
 197.  Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964) (“[W]hen an article 
is unprotected by a patent or a copyright[, for state law to] forbid copying would interfere with the 
federal policy, found in Art. I, [§] 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing federal 
statutes, of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in 
the public domain.”). 
 198.  See Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright 
Philosophy and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1318 (2003). 
 199.  Cf. C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891, 918 
(2002). State funded libraries by their nature are funded with taxes. Cf. Federal Funding, 
AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, http://www.ala.org/advocacy/libfunding/fed (last visited Feb. 28, 
2014). 
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members.200  In either case, the institution would serve as an 
intermediary—purchasing works and making them available to the 
public (or at least the portion of the public that subsidizes the private 
library).201  These actors would simultaneously provide incentive, 
knowledge, and access benefits to the public. 
The second category of access intermediaries is distribution 
intermediaries, who lower the cost of distributing or publishing 
copyrighted works.202  Historically, copyrighted works did not reach the 
public without the movie industry, publishers, and record labels to 
move physical copies.203  Indeed, it is possible that the copyright system 
as it exists today is optimized to incentivize the efforts of distributors, 
not creators.204  One might therefore reasonably question whether it 
makes sense to craft copyright legislation at the request of, or with the 
goal of protecting, such institutions.205  While some scholars have 
criticized the central role of middlemen and aggregators in the content 
industries, others have noted that, despite these flaws, some works still 
require significant precreation funding and centralized postcreation 
distribution, which these intermediaries provide.206 
Internet providers can also serve as distribution 
intermediaries.207  Recall that collection intermediaries generally pay 
for a copy of a work and share it with customers.208  In contrast, a 
 
 200.  Cf. Werner Cohn, Private Stacks, Public Funding, 24 No. 2 AM. LIBRARIES 182–84 
(Feb. 1993), available at http://wernercohn.com/Libraries.html. The materials selected by these 
institutions might look somewhat different than those selected by public libraries. Id. 
 201.  See Trivits v. Wilmington Inst., 417 F. Supp. 160, 163–64 (D. Del. 1976) (noting the 
different tax status of free and private subscription libraries under Delaware law). 
 202.  See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the 
New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 311 (2002) (noting that among other 
virtues, “the Internet and digital technology . . . reduce the transaction costs associated with 
connecting artists to the public”). 
 203.  Jessica Litman, War and Peace: The 34th Annual Donald C. Brace Lecture, 53 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 11 (2006) (conceding that at least until the Internet enabled 
distribution without a significant capital investment, “profit-making intermediaries, who 
understandably need[ed] a business model calculated to produce profits . . . [were] absolutely 
necessary parties in the distribution chain”). 
 204.  See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Copyright without Creators, 9 REV. L. & ECON. 
389 (2013) (arguing that even if copyright does not induce authors and artists to create, it may be 
justified because it induces profit-motivated intermediaries to create). 
 205.  See, e.g., John Quiggin & Dan Hunter, Money Ruins Everything, 30 HASTINGS COMM. 
& ENT. L.J. 203, 245 (2008) (“[H]ighly capitalized intermediaries are no longer necessary for the 
creation, production, dissemination, and use of culturally significant content, and copyright is no 
longer the only mechanism for ensuring that content moves from the author into society.”). 
 206.  See Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39 FLA. ST. L. 
REV. 623, 672–73 (2012) (creating some types of copyrighted expression like movies and television 
programs still requires a significant capital investment and necessitates copyright protection or 
some other mechanism to cover the costs of production and distribution). 
 207.  Cf. Linford, First Publication, supra note 118, at 587. 
 208.  Cf. Baker, supra note 199, at 918. 
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distribution intermediary provides means to move a copy of a work from 
purchaser A to user B.209  Section 512 of the Copyright Act is designed 
to insulate Internet Service Providers (ISPs) from secondary liability 
for copyright infringement, so long as they merely serve as conduits 
between individuals and do not infringe copyright in the work in their 
own right.210 
Some institutions might serve as collection and distribution 
intermediaries, and might thus merit special solicitude.  Peter Menell 
argues, for example, that Congress should have stepped in early in the 
Google Book Search litigation to provide a safe harbor for companies 
working with libraries to scan their archives because of the importance 
of “making the vast knowledge of the Internet,” as well as the contents 
of library archives, accessible “to the public at large.”211  There is a 
difference, however, between intermediaries who pay for the material 
they redistribute and those who do not.  For example, under the current 
statutory regime, whether one has purchased or merely leased a copy 
will determine the subsequent right to use the copy.212  Likewise, a 
library which purchases the copies it distributes to the public might 
have a better claim to solicitude under the Copyright Act than a 
business built on redistributing copies it duplicates without 
compensating the copyright owner—unless maximizing free access is 
the priority. 
In conclusion, these rough guidelines suggest that we can 
identify progress institutions that typically promote the values 
embodied in the First Amendment or the Progress Clause.  This 
institutional framework can provide some assistance in determining 
whether a given incident of institutional tailoring by Congress is in 
harmony or conflict with Progress principles.  For example, libraries are 
institutions that provide access and catalog knowledge, in part by 
making purchases of copyrighted works.  Identifying progress 
institutions is work that courts are particularly well suited to handle, 
because it is the type of inquiry that builds on expertise developed in 
 
 209.  Cf. Linford, First Publication, supra note 118, at 587. Historically, distribution 
channels moved unique copies of works from one location to another. See id. Digital distribution 
through the Internet alters that dynamic by enabling the instantaneous distribution of multiple, 
effectively perfect copies from a single original. See id. 
 210.  17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012); see also Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 
2d 627, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding that while the allegedly infringing cloud storage service 
qualified for the § 512 safe harbor in many respects, the owner of the company was liable for direct 
infringement). 
 211.  Peter S. Menell, Knowledge Accessibility and Preservation Policy for the Digital Age, 
44 HOUS. L. REV. 1013, 1018, 1046 (2007). 
 212.  See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Copyright Exhaustion and the Personal Use 
Dilemma, 96 MINN. L. REV. 2067 (2012); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 
58 UCLA L. REV. 889, 910–11 (2011). 
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making factual assessments in speech cases.213  In addition, to the 
extent that copyright legislation is subject to agency capture,214 a 
financially independent judiciary may also best ensure that the 
requirements of the Progress Clause are met in regulation involving 
copyrighted expression.215 And it is a responsibility the Supreme Court 
will soon need to undertake in the free exercise context in light of 
Hosanna-Tabor.216 
III. IDENTIFYING PROGRESS CLAUSE INSTITUTIONS 
The institutional review framework offers an opportunity to 
focus on where Congress engages in overt and potentially problematic 
tailoring.  Law-making parties—defined broadly to include the 
executive branch, the public, and the interests that typically lobby 
Congress for copyright protection, in addition to courts and Congress—
should pay attention to the disparate treatment codified in the 
Copyright Act.  Disparate treatment is important precisely to the extent 
that it signals something is amiss in the legislative process that will 
lead to constitutionally unjustifiable results.  That treatment may 
indicate public-choice effects, but not all public choice effects are 
pernicious.217  Under the interest-group account of public-choice theory, 
statutory outcomes reflect the bargains struck by the groups that lobby 
Congress.218  Sometimes, Congress can reach the right results through 
imperfect processes, particularly if there is an equilibrium created by 
interest groups lobbying for mutually exclusive desired outcomes.219  
 
 213.  See, e.g., Note, Deference to Legislative Fact Determinations in First Amendment 
Cases after Turner Broadcasting, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2319 (1998) (describing the “norm of 
accuracy” which imposes a duty on appellate courts to conduct an independent review of fact 
records developed by lower courts or administrative agencies).  
 214.  See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an 
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975) (citing George J. Stigler, The Theory 
of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971)). 
 215.  Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1151 
(1991) (arguing that to the extent the focus of the First Amendment has “shifted to protection of 
unpopular, minority speech,” an insulated judiciary arguably best protects it). 
 216.  See generally Robinson, supra note 15, at 181. 
 217.  See, e.g., Brian Galle, The Role of Charity in a Federal System, 53 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 777, 804 (2012). 
 218.  See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an 
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975) (citing George J. Stigler, The Theory 
of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971)). 
 219.  See Galle, supra note 217, at 804. In addition, it has been noted that some lobbying 
for targeted funds by groups that provide mixed goods, like education, can provide public benefits 
like an increase in education overall. See id. 
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Therefore, any solution must focus more on problematic results than 
potentially flawed processes.220 
When institutional tailoring is apparent on the face of the 
statute, the proper question is whether the disparity is justified on 
progress grounds.  When reviewing statutory language granting rights 
or exceptions to rights to certain institutions, a court should ask: “if we 
uphold this statute as constitutional, will the protection granted to the 
particular institution support one or more of the values embodied in the 
Progress Clause?”  If not, i.e., if the group does not externalize progress 
values in its typical operation, it is likely that Congress has overstepped 
its authority under the Progress Clause in light of the chilling effect 
that copyright protection can have on speakers who wish to make use 
of copyrighted expression.221  Thus, the court should hold the statute 
unconstitutional unless Congress has something akin to “a compelling 
government interest” in treating the institution in question differently 
from others and the tailoring is sufficiently narrow to meet that 
purpose.222 On the other hand, where the institution externalizes 
progress values, a court can safely assume that Congress has made its 
decision with an eye toward those values—or at least got lucky—and 
rarely, if ever, should it upset the statutory regime. 
The institutional review framework also provides a structure for 
analyzing flaws in a proposed law before enactment.  Courts engage 
only in ex post review; however, Congress and the President can 
consider whether apparent disparities might signal Progress Clause 
 
 220.  See id. This is a key difference between this Article’s proposed intervention and the 
one proposed by Neil Netanel. Professor Netanel is concerned with “highly organized, amply 
funded, and politically influential speech industries,” Netanel, supra note 4, at 65, and so his 
proposal focuses on looking for evidence of interest-group capture of the drafting process, and 
applying strict scrutiny to the resulting legislation. See id. at 77. Focusing on disparate bargaining 
power cannot resolve every conflict. The Copyright Act of 1976 was primarily a negotiation 
between interest groups, subsequently presented to Congress for its approval. It seems difficult to 
say, for example, that the cable industries had less clout than broadcasters, or publishers than the 
movie industry. See, e.g., Litman, Compromise, supra note 87, at 880–81. What matters most is 
the fruit born by the negotiation, not the negotiation itself.  
 221.  See, e.g., Yen, supra note 57, at 423–33. 
 222.  See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012). This is the “strict 
scrutiny” standard that the Supreme Court uses to describe the review it undertakes when 
considering whether a content-based or viewpoint-based speech restriction violates the First 
Amendment. See id. (“When content-based speech regulation is in question . . . exacting scrutiny 
is required.”); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 71 
(1987) (“Laws having severe effects ordinarily trigger strict scrutiny; laws having significant 
effects ordinarily trigger intermediate scrutiny; and laws having relatively modest effects 
ordinarily trigger deferential scrutiny.”). There is no reason to be particularly wedded to the 
traditional categories. For the public and members of Congress, it will likely be easier to focus on 
whether disparity is present, and whether the institution receiving preferential treatment is a 
valuable link in our national speech or progress infrastructures. Given, however, that this Article 
also aims to signal to courts when it is most useful to engage in a serious constitutional inquiry, it 
can be helpful to couch the discussion in language with which the Court is familiar. 
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problems.  Even if neither the legislative nor the executive branch take 
the strictures of the Progress Clause seriously, it is possible that the 
institutional review framework will trigger  
bottom-up or crowd-sourced engagement with problematic legislative 
enactments.223 
The Copyright Act contains pervasive institutional tailoring.224  
It would take volumes to analyze the entire act through the 
institutional review framework.  Instead, it is illustrative to consider a 
handful of representative cases, suggesting potential revisions and 
potential responses to recently proposed legislation. 
A. “Easy” Cases 
There are some relatively easy cases where Congress reached 
the right result in favor of an institution that promotes speech and 
progress values.  For example, the institutional review framework 
suggests little cause for alarm in regard to the special defenses afforded 
to libraries and archives under section 108 of the Copyright Act.225  
Section 108 gives libraries and archives fairly narrow exceptions to the 
copyright owner’s section 106(1) duplication and section 106(3) 
distribution rights.226  The section also specifies when and how many 
copies a library can make for archival purposes;227 whether the library 
can disseminate digital works to its patrons and how it must handle the 
dissemination;228 and how a library is to deal with the problem of 
“orphan works.”229 
If constitutionally grounded solicitude toward an institution 
should ever trump Congress’s grant of exclusive rights to the author, a 
library seems like the sort of institution that should get a pass.230  
Libraries have historically served as information nexuses for the public 
to discover a broad swath of information at a low cost of entry.  
Consider, for example, the New York Public Library, which aspires to 
provide “true centers of educational innovation and service, vital 
community hubs that provide far more than just free books and 
 
 223.  See infra Part IV. 
 224.  See, e.g., Liu, supra note 80, at 105. 
 225.  17 U.S.C. § 108 (2012). 
 226.  Id. § 108(a). 
 227.  See, e.g., id. § 108(b) (allowing “three copies or phonorecords of an unpublished work”). 
 228.  See, e.g., id. § 108(b)(2) (reproductions in digital format can be distributed or made 
available to the public “outside the premises of the library or archives”). 
 229.  See, e.g., id. § 108(h). Orphan works are works “protected by copyright but whose 
rights holders theoretically cannot be located.” Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, No.  
11-CV-6351, 2012 WL 4808939, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2012). 
 230.  See Schauer, Principles, supra note 12, at 84; HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 205–09. 
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materials” and  “to clos[e] the digital divide” for New Yorkers without 
personal internet access.231  The institution aspires to not only provide 
access to copyrighted works, but also to contribute to the expansion and 
refinement of knowledge by collecting and categorizing the “distinct 
branches of study” that comprise some classical definitions of science.232  
From a progress perspective, libraries are a primary institution 
providing affordable public access to copyrighted works.233  In addition, 
libraries are among the best customers for some classes of authors and 
publishers.234  They can also serve as public-use intermediaries—
disseminating information to the public by paying the copyright owner’s 
asking price so individual members of the public need not do so.235 
It is possible, however, in our new world of costless digital 
reproduction, that there is no real difference between libraries and 
other sources of free copyrighted material, like a BitTorrent feed.236  
Online distributors of individually posted works copied by customers 
have repeatedly been on the losing end of copyright litigation.237  But 
the institutional library differs in part because “each geographically 
located, paper-text library effectively serves a limited number of 
people.”238  Furthermore, libraries have a distinct editorial stance, 
reflected in the works they purchase and provide to the public.239  Based 
on these distinctions, Congress can reasonably provide special 
solicitude for libraries without running afoul of the speaker-neutrality 
requirement of the Speech Clause because libraries are institutions 
that externalize Progress Clause values. 
On the other hand, Congress also makes some indefensible 
missteps in its institutional tailoring.  Section 110 provides exceptions 
to one or more of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights to several 
 
 231.  About The New York Public Library, NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
http://www.nypl.org/help/about-nypl (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
 232.  See Snow, supra note 170, at 259. 
 233.  See About The New York Public Library, supra note 231. 
 234.  Cf. Aaron S. Edlin & D.L. Rubenfield, Exclusion or Efficient Pricing? The “Big Deal” 
Bundling of Academic Journals, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 119, 125–26 (2004) (reporting that academic 
journal prices have increased faster than inflation and that libraries have responded in part to the 
pressure by cutting down on acquisitions of books and monographs).  
 235.  The ability of libraries to loan books to the public is protected in part by the first sale 
right, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109, which allows purchasers of authorized copies to lend them to 
others. 
 236.  See Rebecca Tushnet, My Library: Copyright and the Role of Institutions in A  
Peer-to-Peer World, 53 UCLA L. REV. 977, 986–87 (2006) (explaining that the differences “good” 
libraries and “bad” file-sharers are fewer than one might first imagine). 
 237.  See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 918 (2005). 
 238.  Baker, supra note 199, at 918.  
 239.  See id.; see also Linford, First Publication, supra note 118, at 639–42 (describing the 
differences between print and digital distribution of copyrighted works and their relative effects 
on copyright owners in network theory terms). 
570 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. [Vol. 16:3:533 
groups that do not externalize progress values.240  For example, section 
110(6) insulates governmental bodies or nonprofit agricultural or 
horticultural organizations from liability for infringing performances by 
concessionaires during “an annual agricultural or horticultural fair 
exhibition.”241  Similarly, section 110(10) insulates nonprofit veterans’ 
or fraternal organizations from liability for unlicensed performances, so 
long as the performance is to members, and not the general public, and 
so long as profits after reasonable expenses are used “exclusively for 
charitable purposes.”242  Congress granted this additional protection to 
veterans’ and fraternal organizations notwithstanding section 110(4), 
which insulates charitable performances where the performers are not 
paid.243  As is frequently the case, this particular provision came about 
as a direct result of lobbying.244 
Special protections for veterans’ and fraternal organizations are 
indefensible from a progress perspective.  While the Court has correctly 
recognized that fraternal organizations can engage in activity that has 
First Amendment value for its members, this is no different than any 
other organizations. 245  These organizations do not serve an access-
promoting or knowledge-aggregating function, and insulating them 
from the requirement to pay the price other citizens pay to use 
copyrighted expression is not justifiable on the  
exclusive-right axis.  Thus, denying copyright owners the ability to 
secure licenses for these public performances seems to reflect nothing 
more than a successful lobbying effort benefitting veterans and 
fraternal organizations.246  Similarly, Congress should scrap the specific 
exceptions extended to government organizations and county fairs, as 
there is no progress justification for the preferential treatment those 
institutions either.  They serve neither access nor knowledge 
aggregation functions.  Thus, under the institutional review framework 
this is an easy call.  At first glance, it might seem that the game is not 
worth the candle.  It is perhaps unsurprising that veterans’ 
 
 240.  See 17 U.S.C. § 110(6) (2012). 
 241.  Id. 
 242.  Id. § 110(10). This protection excludes college fraternities and sororities. Id. 
 243.  See id. § 110(4). Jon Garon argues instead that in the context of defenses, Congress 
has the power to “play favorites,” and as there is no economic justification for that favoritism, 
concludes that the subsection 4 exception for charitable organizations and the subsection 5 
exception for radio stations, id. at § 110(5), “can only be justified from the progress perspective.” 
Garon, supra note 198, at 1326. 
 244.  See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 ORE. L. 
REV. 275, 313 n.210 (1989). See also generally Litman, Compromise, supra note 87, at 880. 
 245.  See Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). 
 246.  See Alvin Deutsch, Politics and Poker—Music Faces the Odds, 34 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
U.S.A. 38, 48–49 (1986) (arguing that the § 110(10) exception is evidence of “an erosion of the 
rights of copyright proprietors”). 
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organizations have the ear of Congress, but the lack of potential 
progress values to support the carve-out is indicative of a problem that 
requires focused public attention.  This is especially true if we desire 
copyright protection to operate on something like an equal playing field 
or desire the inequities to be constitutionally justifiable. 
B. 104A Restoration of Foreign Works 
Not every statute will be uniformly consistent or inconsistent 
with the demands of proper institutional tailoring.  For example, 
applying the institutional tailoring framework shows that when 
Congress passed the Uruguay Round Agreement Act (URAA) in 1994, 
it engaged in both constitutional and unconstitutional tailoring.  The 
URAA, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A, restored copyright protection to 
works for which protection had expired because the authors failed to 
observe then-necessary formalities.247  Only works by foreign authors 
were eligible.248  The statute granted no restoration to works by US 
authors.249 
Congress passed the URAA ostensibly to meet international 
intellectual property treaty obligations.250  As Justice Ginsburg 
recounted in Golan v. Holder, Congress was attempting to secure extra 
copyright protection for American authors in foreign jurisdictions by 
extending this protection to foreign authors here.251  However, Congress 
did not use the least speech-restrictive means to accomplish this goal.252  
 
 247.  17 U.S.C. § 104A (2012). Failure to observe formalities like including a copyright 
notice on the work no longer deprives a work of copyright protection. Id. § 408(a). Prior to 1989, 
failing to observe proper formalities could result in a work falling out of copyright protection, which 
happened to many foreign works restored under § 104A. See also Linford, First Publication, supra 
note 118, at 606–07. The URAA also “restored” copyright protection to foreign works that never 
qualified for protection in the first place either because the author’s home country did not have 
“copyright relations” with the United States, or because the work was a sound recording fixed 
before 1972. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 881–82 (2012); see also Jake Linford, Trademark 
Owner as Adverse Possessor, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 703, 738–39 (2013) [hereinafter Linford, 
Adverse Possessor]. 
 248.  17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6) & (8) (2002). 
 249.  Id. 
 250.  See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 879–81. But see id. at 911 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that Congress could have met its treaty obligations in a way that did not cause “so much damage 
to public domain material”); Elizabeth Townsend Gard, In the Trenches with § 104A: An 
Evaluation of the Parties’ Arguments in Golan v. Holder as it Heads to the Supreme Court, 64 
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 199, 203–09 (Oct. 3, 2011). 
 251.  See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878 (“Members of the Berne Union agree to treat authors 
from other member countries as well as they treat their own.” (citing Berne Convention, Sept. 9, 
1886, as revised in Stockholm on July 14, 1967, Art. 1, 5(1), 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 225, 231–33)).  
 252.  See id. at 911–12 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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The dispute in Golan centered on whether the First Amendment or the 
Progress Clause required such effort.253 
Lawrence Golan and similarly situated plaintiffs had made 
expressive use of some foreign works that had fallen out of protection 
and would regain protection under the URAA.254  Golan sued for 
declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that the URAA violated 
both the Progress and Speech Clauses.255  After two rounds of litigation 
in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado and the 
Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court ultimately rejected Golan’s claims.256 
The Supreme Court concluded that the restoration of copyright 
protection to foreign works was not an unconstitutional violation of the 
Progress Clause requirement that an exclusive right be for a limited 
time.257  The First Amendment argument, however, was a closer call.  
During the second round of litigation, the plaintiffs convinced the 
District Court that Golan and his co-plaintiffs had exercised their First 
Amendment rights by creating new expression from then-unprotected 
works.258  The Supreme Court rejected that First Amendment argument 
as well, concluding that the expressive use by Golan and his co-
plaintiffs did not justify “exceptional First Amendment solicitude” of 
their use or create an inviolable public domain.259 
Scholars have criticized the Court’s holding in Golan broadly on 
both speech or progress grounds.260  Applying the institutional review 
framework allows us to focus solely on the statutory disparity in the 
URAA that restores copyright protection to works by foreign authors 
but not American authors.  From a progress perspective, foreign 
authors are not more deserving of profit from their work or more 
 
 253.  See id. at 878.  
 254.  See id. at 878; see also id. at 906 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 255.  See Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1216 (D. Colo. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Golan 
v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 256.  See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 883–84 (2012). 
 257.  See id. at 889. 
 258.  See Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (D. Colo. 2009), rev’d, 609 F.3d 1076 
(10th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S.Ct. 873 (2012). 
 259.  Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 891–92 (2012). 
 260.  See e.g., Fromer, supra note 135, at 1403–05 (concluding that the URAA might have 
exceeded the authority granted under the Progress clause); Linford, Adverse Possessor, supra note 
247, at 738–39 (noting that Golan inverted the standard notion that the public domain is the 
baseline over which copyright protection is imposed); Jessica W. Rice, Case Note, “The Devil Take 
the Hindmost”: Copyright’s Freedom from Constitutional Constraints After Golan v. Holder, 161 U. 
PA. L. REV. ONLINE 283, 298–300 (2013) (stating Golan “has issued so broad a license to Congress 
that ostensibly there remain no principled constitutional safeguards against the public domain's 
continued erosion.”). But see Netanel, Constraints After Golan, supra note 64, at 1103 (arguing 
that although the opinion in Golan narrowly defines the traditional contours of copyright 
protection, it nevertheless “fortifies and gives First Amendment import to the idea/expression 
dichotomy and the fair use defense”). 
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dependent than US residents on the incentive effects attributable to 
copyright protection.261  The failure to restore protection to works 
created by US authors might be justifiable, however, if we could identify 
a public-access or knowledge-expansion ground to leave US authors less 
protected.262  If we assume that the general American public has a 
limited understanding of foreign languages, it is possible that progress 
for US citizens is optimized by providing the broadest access to the most 
valuable knowledge in English.263  That would justify distinguishing 
between works based on the language in which they were written, but 
not on the residency of the author.264  Many foreign residents also write 
or sing in English.265  Other forms of copyrightable expression are not 
language dependent at all.266  Thus, the disparity between foreign and 
domestic authors under the URAA lacks a progress clause 
justification.267 
That is not to say that the Supreme Court would necessarily 
recognize the constitutional implication of denying copyright protection 
to some classes of speakers.  Under the Copyright Act of 1790—the first 
federal copyright provision—no protection was provided foreign 
authors.268  The Court assumes the constitutionality of laws enacted by 
the earliest Congresses because those legislative bodies were comprised 
of the Framers who drafted the Constitution.269  The URAA is, in some 
ways, the mirror image of the Copyright Act of 1790, protecting foreign 
works in disparate ways from domestic works in an effort to secure 
protection for domestic works on foreign shores.270  Consistent with its 
 
 261.  See, e.g., Rice, supra note 260, at 298–300. 
 262.  See id. 
 263.  See Josh Hill, Watch Your Language! The Kansas Law Review Survey of  
Official-English and English-Only Laws and Policies, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 669, 700–01, 703 (2009). 
 264.  See id. 
 265.  See Juan F. Perea, Killing Me Softly, with His Song: Anglocentrism and Celebrating 
Nouveaux Latinas/os, 55 FLA. L. REV. 441, 442 (2003). 
 266.  See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15 § 1, 1 Stat. 124. 
 267.  A broad construction of Congress’s treaty powers might be seen to justify the URAA. 
See, e.g., Shira Perlmutter, Participation in the International Copyright System as a Means to 
Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 332 (2002) (“As a 
practical matter, it would be virtually impossible for the United States to play a leadership role if 
each individual element in each negotiation had to independently promote the progress of science 
in order to make implementing legislation constitutional.  And if the only way to promote the 
progress of science were to provide incentives to create new works, we would lose all flexibility.”). 
But as Heald & Sherry have noted, the Supreme Court has recognized Constitutional limits on 
Congress’s treaty powers in the past, and a limitation grounded in the Progress Clause is equally 
justified. Heald & Sherry, supra note 65, at 1181–83 (citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 
(1920)); see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1957). 
 268.  See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15 § 1, 1 Stat. 124; see also Tyler T. Ochoa, Copyright 
Protection for Works of Foreign Origin, 2 IUS GENTIUM, 167, 167–68 (2008). 
 269.  See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 886 (2012). 
 270.  See id. at 889. 
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general reliance on founding-era statutes to illuminate the scope of 
constitutional restrictions, the Court could conclude that extending 
different levels of protection to foreign and domestic authors is 
standard—or at least one permissible—operating procedure.271  One 
could nevertheless be more confident in the constitutionality of the 
result reached by Congress if the Court had deigned to ask the question.  
Thus, while this Article concludes that the differential protection of 
foreign and domestic authors is not justified on progress grounds, it is 
more important that courts engage in the institutional review than that 
they reach the outcomes proposed by the author. The process itself has 
value. 
There are, however, Progress Clause justifications for a different 
disparity in the URAA.  Congress granted certain “ameliorating 
accommodations” for “reliance” parties who used foreign works before 
the URAA restored protection.272  Reliance parties may continue to 
exploit new works derived from a foreign work, pursuant to a 
compulsory license, so long as the derivative work was created before 
its copyright was restored.273  The more the derivative work differs from 
the restored work, the lower the compensation should be under the 
compulsory license.274  In addition, the URAA obligates the owner of the 
foreign work to notify the public of its intent to enforce a restored 
copyright.275 
These special privileges for users of restored works are 
consistent with the progress values of increasing the knowledge base 
and rewarding authors.276 The public gets access to the reliance party’s 
new work, and the owner of the restored work gets the compulsory 
license as a limited incentive to provide notice to the reliance party. 
 
 271.  Cf. id. at 886–87 (concluding that because federal protection has been extended 
multiple times to specific patents or copyrights, as well as classes of patent and copyright holders, 
the URAA is constitutional); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200–01 (2003) (reaching a similar 
conclusion). 
 272.  17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(4) (2012) (defining reliance party); Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878, 891; 
see also Linford, Adverse Possessor, supra note 247, at 738, n.164. 
 273.  17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(3) (2012). 
 274.  Id. § 104A(d)(3)(B) (in the absence of an agreement, compensation is to be set by a 
district court judge taking into account “the relative contributions of expression of the author of 
the restored work and the reliance party to the derivative work”). 
 275.  Id. § 104A(e). 
 276.  The Court in Golan was willing to discount the First Amendment challenge in part 
because § 104A made some allowance for reliance parties to continue using the restored works, 
subject to a compulsory license. See Linford, Adverse Possessor, supra note 247, at 738 n.164. 
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C. Compulsory Licenses for Radio Broadcasts 
Prior to Thomas Edison’s invention of the phonograph, there was 
no way to technologically record and reproduce sounds.277  Soon after, 
phonographs and radio broadcasts made it possible to broadly 
disseminate performances that first occurred somewhere else.278  For 
nearly the first hundred years of their existence, sound recordings did 
not qualify for federal copyright protection, and the artists who 
produced and distributed them relied on the laws of the several states 
for protection.279  Congress first extended an exclusive federal right to 
reproduce and distribute to sound recordings in 1972,280 which 
continued with the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976.281  Sound 
recordings were not covered by the performance right under the 1976 
Act because radio broadcasters were accustomed to paying only the 
owners of musical works.282 The owner of the sound recording still 
receives no royalty from “terrestrial” radio stations.283 
Congress later crafted a narrower exclusive right to publicly 
perform the sound recording via digital audio transmission.284  The 
digital-audio-transmission performance right granted to sound 
recordings falls into three tiers, based on the nature of the service that 
performs the work. 285  Internet radio stations that stream content 
without any listener input, while technically delivering content by 
digital audio transmission, are treated like terrestrial radio stations 
and are not required to license a performance right from the owner of 
the sound recording.286  At the other extreme, the owner of the sound 
 
 277.  Apparently, the idea of magnetic tape recording was first posited by Sir Francis Bacon 
in 1627, but Edison was the first to make a feasible technology for recording sound that could be 
reproduced as such. See Jordan S. Gruber, Foundation for Audio Recordings as Evidence, 23 AM. 
JUR. PROOF FACTS 3d 315 § 7, n.33 (originally published in 1993, updated Feb. 2014). 
 278.  See Alan Korn, Renaming That Tune: Aural Collage, Parody and Fair Use, 22 GOLDEN 
GATE U. L. REV. 321 (1992). 
 279.  See Linford, First Publication, supra note 118, at 614–16. 
 280.  Act of Jan. 21, 1971. Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(f), 
5(n), 19, 20, 26, 101(e)); 37 C.F.R. § 202.8(b) (1972). 
 281.  Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(2) (2012), with id. § 106(4). 
 282.  See Erich Carey, We Interrupt This Broadcast: Will the Copyright Royalty Board’s 
March 2007 Rate Determination Proceedings Pull the Plug on Internet Radio?, 19 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 257, 264 (2008) (“By the time a sound recording copyright was 
created in 1972, radio broadcasters had enough political influence to persuade Congress to exclude 
sound recordings from claiming a performance right.”). 
 283.  Carey, supra note 282, at 266–67 (“Effectively this maintains the status quo; a 
broadcast of a sound recording on traditional AM or FM radio still does not constitute a 
compensable performance under the Copyright Act after the enactment of the DPRA.”).  
 284.  17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012). 
 285.  Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1629–30 (2001).  
 286.  17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1) (2012). 
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recording can secure a property-like injunction against digital 
performance by a limited class of operators—those that provide 
customers with interactive digital transmissions,287 i.e., systems that 
allow users to pick songs online and play them upon request.288  Thus, 
to avoid liability for infringing the digital performance right, operators 
of interactive services must pay the owner’s asking price.289 
In the middle ground, the exclusive right to publicly perform the 
sound recording via digital audio transmission is subject to a 
compulsory license.290  Operators of subscription services that limit 
playback requests may perform the sound recording without 
negotiating with the owner of the sound recording, upon payment of a 
compulsory license.291  Digital subscription services are available over 
cable or satellite, or over the Internet.292  For the former, the compulsory 
license rate is calculated pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 801(b).293  The rate for 
Internet radio stations is calculated pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 112(e)(4), 
known as the “willing buyer, willing seller standard.”294  Under both 
standards, the Copyright Royalty Board—a body comprised of copyright 
judges on rotating appointments—makes the rate determination 
according to standards set out in the respective statutes.295  The 
standards differ, and to date, the § 801(b) rate has been much lower 
than the “willing buyer, willing seller” rate.296  When setting a 
compulsory license rate for satellite and cable radio stations, § 801(b) 
requires Copyright Royalty Judges to take into account the interests of 
all relevant parties potentially affected by copyright protection, 
including members of the public.297  The “willing buyer, willing seller” 
 
 287.  Id. § 114(j)(7). 
 288.  Id. 
 289.  Carey, supra note 282, at 287 (“Interactive services do not qualify for statutory 
licensing, and hence such services must negotiate privately with record labels for the right use of 
sound recordings.”). 
 290.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012); Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Librarian of Congress, 
176 F.3d 528, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (copyright owner of sound recording is required to grant a license 
“to those who seek to transmit sound recordings”). 
 291.  See Andrew Stockment, Note, Internet Radio: The Case for a Technology Neutral 
Royalty Standard, 95 VA. L. REV. 2129, 2138 (2009). 
 292.  See id. 
 293.  Cable and satellite broadcasters can opt out of the compulsory license by negotiating 
directly with owners of sound recordings. See id. at 2166. 
 294.  See 17 U.S.C. § 112(e)(4) (2012); see also Stockment, supra note 291, at 2138–39. 
 295.  See id. at 2131. 
 296.  See id. at 2161–62, 2166. 
 297.  17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2012) (compulsory license rates are to maximize the 
availability of creative works to the public; secure a fair return to the copyright owner; reflect the 
relative contributions, creative and otherwise, by the owner and distributor; and to minimize 
disruptive impact on current industry practices). 
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standard, which governs Internet radio stations, effectively takes into 
account only the needs of the copyright owner.298 
Recently, two proposed corrections began wending their way 
through Congress.  One, the Internet Radio Fairness Act (IRFA), 
proposes to reduce the amount that Internet stations pay to the lower 
cable and satellite rate under § 801(b).299  Pandora, one of the largest 
Internet radio stations, firmly supports the IRFA.300  This is 
unsurprising, as passage of the IRFA could save Pandora significant 
licensing fees.301  The other, the Interim FIRST Act (FIRST Act), 
proposes to bring everyone up to the “willing buyer, willing seller” 
standard, ostensibly to insure that artists and record labels receive the 
compensation to which they are entitled.302 
Assuming that licensing uniformity is desirable, and one act or 
the other should pass, the IRFA is better suited to serve progress 
goals.303  Satellite and cable stations that charge customers for 
subscriptions would need to pass an increased license rate required by 
the FIRST Act on to consumers, while subscription-based Internet radio 
stations could pass savings on to consumers under the IRFA.  
Nonsubscription stations would have pass costs, or could pass savings, 
on to advertisers.  If it proves difficult to recoup the increased licensing 
fees, satellite stations that rely on advertising dollars to provide free 
Internet music service would need to charge consumers, or work with 
smaller profit margins.  Implementing the FIRST Act could thus reduce 
the number of satellite and cable radio providers, which in turn would 
reduce access to less popular programs, as advertisers are more likely 
to gravitate to top-40 programming.304  Thus, access to some Internet 
programming would be restricted. 
 
 298.  See id. § 114(f)(2)(B); Stockment, supra note 291, at 2165–66. 
 299.  Internet Radio Fairness Act of 2012, S. 3609, 112th Cong (2d Sess. 2012). 
 300.  See Ben Sisario, Proposed Bill Could Change Royalty Rates for Internet Radio, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/24/business/media/proposed-bill-could-
change-royalty-rates-for-internet-radio.html. 
 301.  See Andrew Richards, Opinion: Are Pandora’s Music Genome Operational Costs 
Worth It?, O MUSIC AWARDS BLOG (Dec. 5, 2012), http://blog.omusicawards.com/2012/12/opinion-
are-pandoras-music-genome-operational-costs-worth-it.   
 302.  See Jerry Nadler, Interim Fairness in Radio Starting Today Act of 2012 (Aug. 7, 2012, 
3:36 PM), http://www.nab.org/documents/newsRoom/pdfs/082012_Nadler_streaming_ 
rates_bill.pdf; see also Jennifer Martinez, Nadler Circulates Draft Legislation on Music Royalties, 
THE HILL: HILLICON VALLEY (Aug. 20. 2012, 6:59 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-
valley/technology/244413-nadler-circulates-draft-legislation-on-music-royalties. 
 303.  But see DiCola, supra note 11 at 1895-99 (arguing that neither IRFA nor the FIRST 
Act sufficiently meets a principle grounded in the First Amendment that requires equal treatment 
of music distributor). 
 304.  Cf. Steve Johnson, Top 40 Radio is Back on Top, POPMATTERS (Oct. 9, 2009), 
http://www.popmatters.com/article/112858-top-40-radio-is-back-on-top.   
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In addition, while the owners of musical compositions and sound 
recordings would recoup more licensing fees per use under the FIRST 
Act, a high compulsory licensing fee is no more consistent with a 
natural-right justification for copyright protection than a low one, 
regardless of the value of the compulsory license.  Furthermore, the 
IRFA uses the §801(b) standard, which requires Copyright Royalty 
Judges to take into account not only the needs of copyright owners, but 
also radio stations as access intermediaries and the public as 
listeners.305  As either compulsory license ignores autonomy interests, 
Congress should choose the process that better applies progress values 
and also leads to lower costs.306  Here, the institutional review 
framework gives us a fairly clear indication of which statutory 
enactment the public should support. 
IV. PUBLIC INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
When invited to consider First Amendment critiques of the 
Copyright Act, the Court has been reluctant to apply traditional First 
Amendment scrutiny, although it has continued to recognize that First 
Amendment values are inherent in the copyright regime.307  The 
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have even stepped back from the active 
policing of intellectual property protection demonstrated by the Warren 
Court.  For example, in Graham v. John Deere Co.,308 the Court held 
that the state could not secure to an inventor a patent on an invention 
already in the public domain.309  Turning again to the question of the 
permeability of the public domain in Golan, the Court characterized as 
dicta the oft-cited perspective from Graham that the Progress Clause 
limits Congress’s power to craft intellectual property protections.310  
The Court in Golan found the Graham holding that an invention was 
not eligible for patent protection entirely unrelated to the question of 
 
 305.  See supra notes 293–298 and accompanying text. 
 306.  But see DiCola, supra note 11 at 1897 (criticizing IRFA’s focus on drastically lowering 
royalty rates for webcasters because “[e]qual treatment [of music distribution services] has 
economic benefits that have nothing to do with reducing the level of royalties, which is a separate 
policy choice.”). 
 307.  See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text. 
 308.  Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). 
 309.  See id. at 6 (holding that “Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose 
effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to 
materials already available”); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229–30 
(1964) (patents may issue, under the Progress Clause, only when “a genuine ‘invention’ or 
‘discovery’ [can] be demonstrated,” and limitations on the exercise of the patent must be “strictly 
enforced” (internal citations omitted)). 
 310.  See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 887 (2012).   
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Congress’ power to increase a patent’s duration.311  As the Tenth Circuit 
noted in its review of Golan, “Congress has expansive powers when it 
legislates under the [Progress] Clause, and this court may not interfere 
so long as Congress has rationally exercised its authority.”312 
One way to read Golan, and its predecessor Eldred, is that 
together they suggest that the current Court is simply uninterested in 
claims that congressional activity in the intellectual property sphere 
should remain within the boundaries set by the Progress Clause and 
the First Amendment.313  The Supreme Court’s deferential stance in 
Eldred and Golan leaves the public without an effective ex post check 
on congressional activity.  Any amendments to the Copyright Act that 
cross the President’s desk with a signature may be effectively immune 
from institutional review. 
While this Article makes the case for carefully scrutinizing 
institutional tailoring, it is possible that the Court cannot be moved 
from looking at copyright as the kind of regime “that does not need to 
be subjected to normal First Amendment [or Progress Clause] 
analysis.”314  But pressing the issue, even on the losing side, has some 
inherent value.  As Professor Schauer notes, “winning is better than 
losing publicly, but losing publicly is perhaps still preferable to being 
ignored.”315  Ideally, a renewed focus on disparate treatment will 
encourage the Supreme Court to apply more searching constitutional 
analysis of the Copyright Act, at least where the disparate protection 
signals potential public choice problems.316  And there has been some 
positive motion—eight of the Justices in Eldred “acknowledged that the 
First Amendment was not totally irrelevant.”317 
Furthermore, public losses can motivate public responses.  For 
example, when the Supreme Court decided, in Kelo v. City of New 
London, that using eminent domain to seize the homes of residents to 
build a business complex was a “public use” under the Takings Clause, 
state and local law-making bodies responded quickly to mollify public 
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disapproval.318  David Fagundes has noted that the public outcry to the 
Court’s decision in Eldred was relatively muted.319  More recently, 
however, the public has been motivated to respond to proposed 
legislation that looks like a congressional overreach in the intellectual 
property realm.  In 2011, the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) was 
introduced in the House of Representatives,320 and the Preventing Real 
Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual 
Property Act (PIPA) was introduced in the Senate.321  The bills included 
“highly technical DNS blocking provisions that were strongly opposed 
by engineers, Internet founders, and law professors.”322  The opposition 
of informed parties was a starting point, but the passage of SOPA and 
PIPA seemed fait accompli until the general public—tipped off by a day 
of Internet blackouts on popular services like  
Wikipedia—responded en mass to protests the bills.323  While the public 
response was certainly encouraged by ISPs and intermediaries who 
viewed it as a threat to the operation of the Internet,324 it was the public 
response, not the centralized opposition, that sent legislators of all 
political stripes scurrying to distance themselves from the bill.325 
There are two problems facing public advocacy on copyright 
policy.  The institutional review framework can help ameliorate both.  
First, statutory language can be complex, particularly for recent 
revisions to the Act.326  This complexity tends to exacerbate the second 
problem: it is difficult for a diffuse populace to mobilize as effectively as 
a smaller, concentrated group with similar goals.  This collective action 
problem makes public advocacy difficult, demonstrably so when we 
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consider the way copyright law is shaped in favor of copyright owners, 
often without considering the needs of copyright users.327 
The institutional review framework can facilitate activism, 
encouraging both copyright critics and enthusiasts to ask at an early 
stage whether new additions to the Copyright Act are consistent with 
the congressional mandate.  If the Court plans to continue its historical 
hands-off approach when reviewing copyright enactments for 
constitutional validity, perhaps the public can crowd source some 
hands-on responses.328  The institutional review framework will provide 
a way to think about when action might be required.  With luck, 
pressure from both courts and the public will encourage the legislative 
and executive branches to consider the impact of copyright legislation 
on our constitutional values of preventing the abridgement of speech 
and promoting of progress.  At all stages, applying the institutional 
review framework can flush out the most obvious and problematic cases 
of institutional tailoring. 
It is hard to imagine frequent negative public responses to 
copyright legislation like those that met SOPA and PIPA.  
Nevertheless, the institutional review framework can give the public 
something relatively obvious to watch for.329  Where a copyright 
provision gives extra protection to certain copyright holding institutions 
rather than all copyright holders, or provides a defense to one 
institutional user rather than the public as a whole, society should 
collectively ask whether the disparate treatment is consistent with 
constitutional values.  If not, this could serve as a signal that a bottom-
up, crowd-sourced response is appropriate. 
Drawing the attention of courts and the public to disparate 
treatment does not prevent either group from giving careful scrutiny to 
situations where disparate treatment is not apparent on the face of a 
statute.  The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, for 
example, is full of cases where a statute that is content-neutral on its 
face is held unconstitutional because it provides too much discretion to 
the executive.330  The Court is capable of locating problematic discretion 
in those cases and would be able to apply the same skill set to determine 
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if statutes that are ostensibly egalitarian nevertheless threaten critical 
constitutional values.  The institutional review framework simply 
provides a structure to consider problematic disparity in the Copyright 
Act. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article lays bare the tension between the Supreme Court’s 
extreme distrust of speaker-based speech restrictions and the Court’s 
extremely deferential embrace of Congress’s authority to pass copyright 
legislation that differentiates between institutions.  Consistency might 
suggest stripping all disparate treatment from the Copyright Act, but 
some disparity may promote the goals embodied in the Progress Clause.  
At a minimum, examining the institutional tailoring in the Copyright 
Act by asking which, if any, favored institutions externalize Progress 
Clause values should sharpen judicial review, shape congressional 
activity, and provide a path for public action with regard to copyright 
reform. 
 
